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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Mutual funds and hedge funds are popular forms of investment in the United
States and throughout the world. Mutual funds are regulated by securities' regulators in
the United States. Hedge fimds, however, are not regulated because of their operational
flexibility in investment.
George Soros, manager of the famous Quantum Fund, is a successful case in
the industry of hedge funds; his Quantum Fund recorded "4 1 percent net returns" per year
between 1990 and 1994.' However, the near-bankruptcy of the Long-Term
Capital Management Limited Partnership (LTCM), "the Cadillac of hedge funds" with
two Nobel prize winners among its partners,^ demonstrates the negative side of hedge
funds: this episode indicated even one hedge fund could threaten the world financial
market. In addition, while common hedge fund failures followed the normal process in
the financial market, only LTCM was uniquely rescued by a consortium of fourteen
international institutions in September 1998. This "unprecedented" rescue underlined the
"irony," or the "double standard" nature of the United States because America persuaded
other countries including Asian countries which had economic crises to follow market
M. Corey Goldman, House Eyes Fund Rules Legislation Expected Thursday, though Experts Deem It Too
Little Too Late, CNNfn, Sept. 22, 1999. <http://cnnfh.com/1999/09/22/news/hedge>
Hedge Funds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions ofthe House Comm. on Banking
and Financial Services, 106 Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearings 4] (opening statement of Marge
Roukema, Chairwoman) ; LTCM was the largest hedge fund by asset size in 1996. Beverly Chandler,
Investing with the Hedge Fund Giants 3 (1998).
Some famous partners are as follows: (1) John Meriwether who pioneered fixed-income arbitrage at
Salomon Brothers and was Salomon vice chairman; (2) David W. Mullins Jr. who was vice chairman of the
discipline in dealing with defaulted companies/ yet it failed to use such discipline in
dealing with LTCM.
The House banking committee discussed the risk of hedge funds on April 13,
1994.^ During the committee meeting, it was mentioned that "highly leveraged hedge
firnds were cited as a source of market volatility in the 1987 market break," and "highly
leveraged hedge funds appeared to have played a role in the 1 992 European currency
crisis."^ Regulators, however, treated the risks of hedge funds to national banks very
lightly and thought that banks could control those risks because their credit exposure was
small. ^ In addition, after the European bond market turbulence, the central bankers of the
Group often countries considered the regulation of hedge funds but did not decide upon
immediate regulation. .
Since the Asian financial crises in the late 1 997, there have been debates about the
impact of the speculative activities of hedge funds on the Asian financial market and
emerging markets. ' However, most advanced countries and international financial
communities had not concerned themselves with the activities of hedge funds. Since the
near-collapse ofLTCM, most developed countries and the international financial
Federal Reserve Board; (3) Myron Scholes who was the 1997 Nobel economics prize winner; and (4)
Robert Merton who was the 1997 Nobel economics prize wiimer.
See Risks that Hedge Funds pose to the Banking System: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 103'^'' Cong. (1994) [hereinafter Hearings 1] (written testimony of Henry T. C.
Hu, Professor of Law, University of Texas).<http://www.house.gov/banking/10198wit.htm>
^ Mark Jickling, Hedge Funds, 5, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, (June 21, 1994).
^ Hearings 1 , supra note 4 (statement of Hon. James A. Leach).
'Id
^ The credit exposure of eight national banks was no more than $526 million at that time. Id. (testimony of
Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller, OCC).
^ See Mark Jickling, supra note 5, at 5.
'" See Takehiko Nakao, Hedge Funds and International Financial Markets (July 1999).
<http;//www.mofgo.jp/englishyififD06.htm>; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets ofthe
House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106* Cong. (1999)[hereinafter Hearings 5] (testimony
of Leon M. Metzger, President, Paloma Partners Co., LLC), <http://www.house.gov/banking/3399wit.htm>
if.. ' <..>.,
community have become concerned about the impact of hedge funds on the financial
market.'^ In response to this, Congress had a hearing again on October 1, 1998 due to the
near-failure ofLTCM caused by high leverage. Consequently, "The Hedge Fund
Disclosure Act" was introduced by a Congressman into the House of Representatives.
Regulation of hedge funds was considered on several occasions. No action, however,
was taken because of the lack of "conclusive evidence" of "market volatility"'''even
though the impact of hedge funds on the financial market was very powerful '^because of
their aggressive trading strategies and leverage.
U.S. regulators are concerned that if they regulate hedge funds, hedge fiinds will,
along with their economic benefits, emigrate to offshore havens. However, ifwe
consider the importance of the American financial markets in the world, this idea can be
dismissed. Due to globalization in the capital markets, small events in the United States
can have large effects in the world market. In addition, the bankruptcy of hedge funds
can have severe consequences as we can see why the Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York
" See Takehiko Nakao, supra note 10; See World Economic Outlook, IMF, I, 5, Box 1 (May 1998)
[hereinafter Outlook May 1998].
'^ See Takehiko Nakao, supra note 10; ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) discussed ways to curb hedge fund
activity, and Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will discuss the need to urge banks to restrict
their lending to hedge funds. Japan LDP to Debate Ways to Curb Hedge Funds, REUTERS, Jan.26,
1 999 <http://www. http://biz.yahoo.com/r£'990 1 26/b4a.html>
'^ H.R.2924, 1 06* Cong. ( 1 999).
'"* Mark Jickling, supra note 5, at 1.
'^ See Hearings 3, supra note 10 (testimony of Lewis A. Sachs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dept. of
the Treasury).
'^ See Report of The President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the
Lessons ofLong-Term Capital Management (April, 1999)[hereinafter The President 's Working Group
Report], <http://www.cftc.gov/tm/hedgefundreport.htm>
' Hedge Fund Operations: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 105
Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Hearings 2] (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, FED), (testimony of
Richard R. Lindsey, Director, SEC) <http://www.house.gov/banking/10198wit.htm>; The Managed Funds
Association, a trade group that represents 700 hedge funds and managed futures funds, criticized the
President's Working Group Report. Michael Schroeder, Hedge Funds Blast Plan [for] Disclosure of
Internal-Financial Data, Dow JONES Newswires, May 7, 1999.
(FRBNY) intervened in LTCM's recapitalization. In addition, there was a suggestion
that the United States should be the first to enact legislation regulating hedge funds since
most hedge funds are in America, and such regulation would be very effective.'
Therefore, regulation of hedge funds by the United States is vital.
This paper will explain the hedge funds industry, explore the definition of hedge
fimds, their structure, their investors, and their effects on the financial market. It will also
evaluate the difference in securities regulation between mutual funds and hedge funds. In
particular, it will fully discuss some problems in the LTCM episode and other hedge fund
debacles. In addition, it will explain the activities of the financial community. In
conclusion, it will present my suggestions for regulation.
'* See World Economic Outlook and International Capital Markets Interim Assessment, III, 54, Box 3.4,
IMF (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter Outlook Dec. 1998]; There were concerns about possible disruptions in the
U.S. and global marketplace if LTCM had failed. Hearings 2, supra note 17 (testimony of Richard R.
Lindsey, Director, SEC); Recently, Tiger Management Funds (Tiger), one of the biggest hedge ftinds in the
world, announced plans to liquidate all investment in the market. In fact. Tiger was an example of a
successful hedge fund, and it has been in the spotlight since 1980. Because of Tiger's high returns, many
hedg fiinds were incorporated in the financial market. It started with capital of $8.8 million in May of
1980, and its capital reached $21 billion in 1999. Its compound average return was 3 1 .7 percent, but since
August of 1998, its profit has declined. This episode indicates that there seem to be some warning signs in
the hedge fund industry. Jennifer Karchmer, Tiger Management Closes its doors, CNNfn, March 30, 2000
<http://cnnfn/2000/03/30/mutualfunds/q_ftinds_tiger>
'^ Takehiko Nakao, supra note 10.
CHAPTER II
THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
Origin and Development
Even though hedge funds have only come into the spotlight recently, their history
is not short. Alfred W. Jones made the first hedge fund as a general partnership on Jan. 1
,
J 949 20 jj^ f^^j.^ j^g ^^g ^ sociologist, then a journalist, and at last became a fund manager.
While he was preparing for his article "Fashions in Forecasting" in Fortune in March
1 949, he found new investment skills in the financial market. He planned to reduce
some market risks produced by holding "a long stock position" with "market-neutral"
strategy. ^^ He changed his investment method "from market timing to stock picking."^^
He used unique systems, i.e., short sales, leverage, and incentive fees, for the first time in
the financial market.^"* In the beginning, he used a limited partnership which invested
with several independent portfolio managers. After that, he changed his hedge fund from
a general partnership to "a multi-manager hedge fund" in 1952.
Carol J. Loomis used publicly the name "hedge fionds" for the first time in her
Fortune magazine article, "The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With," in April 1966.^^ The
article introduced a "hedge fund" managed by Alfred W. Jones; the fund's performance
^^ Matthias Bekier, MARKETING OF HEDGE FUNDS 73 (1996).
^* Stephen J. Brown et al., Offshore Hedge Funds: Survival & Performance 1989-1995, 3 (Jan. 2, 1998);
William N. Goetzmann, Hedge Funds, Yale School of Management BZW Presentation (1997)
<http://viking.som.yale.edu/will/presentations/hedge/scd003.htm>; Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and
the Collapse ofLong-Term Capital Management, 189, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 2, (1999).
^^ Phillipp Cottier, HEDGE FUNDS AND MANAGED Futures 13 (1997).
''Id
'* Beverly Chandler, supra note 2, at 3.
''Id
after the 20 percent incentive fee was better than most mutual ftands' performance, which
surprised the financial community.
After that, many hedge fimds appeared: a hundred hedge funds were operating
within a few years?^ Many fiind managers, however, were confronted with high losses
and bankruptcy during 1969 and 1970.^^ Hedge funds had a hard time again during 1973
and 1974.^*^ Moreover, many hedge funds had problems in 1994 because of "the strong
increase of American interest rates," but the hedge fund industry recovered in 1 995 and
1996.^^
The 1968 survey of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) found
approximately 140 hedge funds in operation among 215 partnerships, but the hedge fund
industry has developed enormously since the late 1960's : due to global financial
liberalization, hedge funds have increased and could have "internationally diversified
portfolios."^^
Nowadays, estimates for the number of hedge funds operating and for the amount
of assets they manage vary. For example, the Report of President's Working Group on
Financial Markets (hereinafter President's Working Group report) indicated that about
2,500 to 3,500 hedge funds were managing $200 to $300 billion in capital as of mid-
1998^'* and handled about $800 billion to $1 trillion in total assets.^^ On the other hand,
^^ Stephen J. Brown et al., supra note 21, at 4.
^^ Barry Eichengreen et al., HEDGE FUNDS AND FrNANCIAL MARKET DYNAMICS 27, Occasional Paper
No.166, IMF(May 1998).
^* Stephen J. Brown et al., supra note 21, at 4.
^^ Phillipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 13.
'' Id. at 14.
^ The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16; Stephen J. Brown et al., Offshore Hedge Funds:
Survival & Performance 1989-1995 4 (Jan. 1998).
" Barry Eichengreen et al., supra note 27, at 5.
'Ud
the estimate of Mar/Hedge, a major source database on hedge fund performance, showed
that 1,100 hedge funds were managing $92.2 billion in assets in 1997."^^ Van Hedge Fund
Advisors, a Nashville, Tennessee-based investment advisory firm, estimated that there
were about 5,830 hedge funds worldwide.
The position of the hedge funds industry is small relative to other investment
TO
vehicles in the U.S. financial markets. For example, the volume of other investment
sectors in total assets as of the end of 1998 was as follows: " (1) commercial banks had
$4.1 trillion, (2) mutual funds had $5 trillion, (3) private pension funds had
4.3 trillion, (4) State and local retirement funds had $2.3 trillion, and (5) insurance
companies had $ 3.7 trillion." ^^
According to data of the President's Working Group report, most hedge funds
control less than $100 million in capital. '*° In addition, the number of hedge funds that
have capital with more than $ 1 billion is ver>' small, and just a few exceed $ 5 billion.'*'
In the 1994 Hedge/Mar ranking, there were 57 hedge funds which had over $100 million
under management.
Activities and Influence
Even though hedge funds occupy only a small portion of the financial market,
their impact is severe due to their leverage and highly aggressive trading strategies. ^^
'^ Beverly Chandler, supra note 2, at 23.
^^ M. Corey Goldman, supra note 1.
^* The President 's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
''Id.
''Id
'Ud
*^ Matthias Bekier, supra note 20, at 523-24.
'*' See The President 's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
8Hedge funds use various investment methods including highly quantitative techniques or
more subjective factors. Usually, hedge funds use more aggressive derivatives and short
positions than mutual funds. In particular, hedge fund managers want to get "absolute
returns" because of their performance fee system.
There are different theories regarding the impact of hedge funds on the world
financial market. Some argue that hedge funds make markets efficient because
they provide liquidity and stability and assert that hedge funds can affect the "financial
innovation and the reallocation of financial risk." In contrast, others claim that "hedge
funds jeopardize the viability of sovereign states." For example, the Prime Minister of
Malaysia criticized the actions of hedge funds for causing his country's financial crisis.
Hedge funds, however, only had "short positions" in the Thailand baht during the Asian
economic crises: they had "long positions" in Indonesia, "modest positions" in Malaysia,
and "no significant positions" in the Philippines. Recent research has also shown that
hedge funds have not played an important role in the financial market crises of the past
few years.
''^
^ee Beverly Chandler, 5MjPra note 2, at 3.
'*^ The President 's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
*^ Hearings 2, supra note 17 (opening statement of James A. Leach, Chairman).
''^ He accused Soros [hedge funds] of speculating in the Malaysian ringgit in the summer of 1997. Beverly
Chandler, supra note 2, at xiii.
"** Even though hedge funds had approximately $7 billion transactions in Thailand, hedge funds did not play
important role in the crisis. Barry Eichengreen and Donald Mathieson, Hedge Funds: What Do We Really
Knows? Economic Issue 19, IMF (Sept. 1999) <http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/issuesl9/index.htm>
"^^ Stephen J. Brown et al.. Hedge Funds and the Asian Currency Crisis of1997, 13, NBER Working Paper
No. 6427 (Feb. 1998); Hearings 3, supra note 10 (testimony of Leon M. Metzger); Hearings 2, supra note
17 (opening statement of James A. Leach, Chairman): A study on foreign investors' herding effect before
the period of Korea's economic crisis found no evidence that foreign investors had negative effect on
Korea's stock market. Hyuk Choe, et al., Do Foreign Investors Destabilize Stock Markets? The Korean
Experience in 7997 21, NBER (June 1998).
Performance
Hedge fund's performance has generally indicated that hedge funds return more
profits than Standard and Poor's S&P 500 stock index, and some hedge funds have
returned more than other investment vehicles which have had bad returns. ^° However, a
study of offshore hedge funds' performance illustrated that average armual offshore
hedge fiind returns from 1989 to 1995 were lower than the S&P 500 returns.^'
^^ The President 's Working Group Report, supra note 16; Mark Jickling, supra note 5, at 3.
^' Stephen J. Brown et al., supra note 21, at 10.
CHAPTER III
THE LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HEDGE FUNDS
Mutual Funds Structure
Definition
A mutual fund is "an investment company that pools money from
shareholders wherein the capital is invested in a diversified portfolio of securities."
Section 4 of the Investment Company Act (ICA)^ divides investment companies into
three classes: (1) "Face-amount certificate company,"^"* (2) " Unit Investment trust,"
and (3) "Management company." Management companies are again classified into
"open-end companies," and "closed-end companies."^^ The so-called "mutual fund" is
C-7 CO
colloquially termed an "open-end investment company." The open-end investment
company is "any investment company which is offering for sale or has outstanding any
redeemable security of which it is the issuer."^^ There is also another classification of
mutual funds: (1) stock or equity, (2) bond and income, and (3) money market.
The advantages of investing in mutual funds are many: (1) professional
management, (2) diversification, (3) economies of scale, (4) liquidity, (5) convenience
^^ Robert C. Pozen, The Mutual Fund Business 16 (1998).
" 15U.S.C. §80a-4.
^'* Face-amount certificate is debt obligation. 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a)(15).
^^ Unit investment trusts are a fixed pool of securities. Gould & Lins, Unit Investment Trusts, 43 Bus. LAW.
1177-1205(1988).
^M5 U.S.C. §80a-5(a).
'^ Joseph R. Fleming, Regulation ofSeries Investment Companies under The Investment Company of 1940,
44 Bus. Law. 1179n. 1 (1989).
^* Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
^M5 U.S.C. §80a-5(a)(l).
^^ Robert C. Pozen, supra note 52, at 16.
10
11
and ease of record-keeping, (6) strict government regulation, and (7) full disclosure.
Structure
A mutual fund can be structured as a corporation or a business trust. In fact, all
mutual funds have external management styles. ^^ Thus, mutual funds are composed of
affiliated organizations and independent contractors who operate mutual fUnds.^'*
In a typical mutual fiind, there are shareholders, a board of directors, an
investment adviser or management company, a distributor, a custodian, independent
public accounts, and a transfer agent.^^ Among them, the investment adviser or
management company manages the fund's portfolio according to the objectives described
in the fund's prospectus.^
Hedge Funds Structure
Definition
Under the securities regulations, there is no precise legal definition of hedge
funds.^^ Hedge funds are described as "a variety of pooled investment vehicles that
are not registered under the federal securities laws as public corporations, investment
companies, or broker-dealers" or " any pooled investment vehicle that is privately
organized, administered by professional investment managers, and not widely available
to the public."^^
*' See A Guide to Understanding Mutual Funds, 5 ,The Investment Company Institute (1998) [hereinafter
Guide] <http://www.ici.org >; See Victoria E. Schonfeld and Thomas M. J. Kerwin, Organization ofa
Mutual Fund, 49 BUS. Law . 107 (Nov. 1993).
*^ See Guide, supra note 61 , at 12.
^^ See Id.
^ See Id.
" See Id
^ See Id.
See The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
12
The investors of hedge funds are mainly wealthy individuals and sophisticated
institutional investors. Because there is no clear definition of hedge funds, their
characteristics are often used to determine whether an investment vehicle is a hedge
ftind.^' In fact, not all hedge funds use "hedging" even though Jones used "long and
77
short" skills in order to hedge.
There are some contradictions in the definitions ofhedge funds. Whether hedge
funds could be described as mutual funds is questionable. Soros defined hedge funds as
"a mutual fund that employs leverage and uses various techniques of hedging."^"* The
chairman of Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System (FED) stated that "LTCM is
a hedge fund, or a mutual ftind that is structured to avoid regulation by limiting its
clientele to a small number of highly sophisticated, very wealthy individuals and that
seeks high rates of return by investing and trading in a variety of financial instruments."
On the other hand. Vanguard group provides that hedge funds are not mutual funds.'' In
my view, hedge funds are kinds of derivatives of mutual fimds because hedge funds
^* Hearings I, supra note 4 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) ; Hearing 2, supra note 17
(testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, SEC) ; Private investment vehicles that tend to be organized as
private limited partnerships and are exempt from regulation under the ICA. Hearings I, supra note 4
(testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller, OCC).
The President 's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
™ How Hedge Funds dijferfrom Mutual Funds, The Vanguard Group (1999) [hereinafter Hedge Funds]
<http://www.vanguard.com/cgi-bin/NewsPrint/908307468>
'' See Phillipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 15.
^^ See Beverly Chandler, supra note 2, at 3.
" Other definitions are as follows: (1 ) an investment partnership or mutual that is unregulated; (2) one that
seeks high rates of return by investing or trading in virtually any form of financial instrument; (3) an entity
that may take long and short positions and invest in many markets; (4) an entity that uses leverage; and (5)
an entity whose manager's compensation is based on its financial performance. Hearings 1, supra note 4
(statement of John P. Laware, Member, FED).
Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA), Hedgefunds (1996); Beverly Chandler, supra
note 2, at 5; Hedge funds are basically "unregulated mutual funds." Mark Jickling, supra note 5, at 3.
Hearings 2, supra note 17 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, FED).
Hedge Funds, supra note 70; Hedge funds are "unregulated mutual fiinds." But See Mark Jickling, supra
note 5, at 1.
13
adopted their main structure from mutual funds, and their systems are similar to mutual
funds. • •
Classification
Hedge ftinds can be classified according to the main investment strategy in the
funds' management: (1) "global-macro" hedge funds which take positions grounded on
their predictions of world macro-economic growths; (2) "event-driven" hedge funds that
invest in specific securities concerning bankruptcies, reorganizations, and mergers; and
77
(3) "market-neutral" hedge funds which use relative-value strategies. In addition, there
are other classifications such as "long-only" hedge funds, "sectoral" hedge funds,
-TO
"dedicated short sales" hedge funds, and "funds of funds." Hedge funds are also
classified in their use of different types of financial instruments: hedge funds trade equity
or fixed income securities and use exchange-traded futures contracts or over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives. Moreover, there are two classes of hedge funds by organizational
styles. First, one or more people organize hedge funds with specific trading
7Q
philosophies; second, an advising vehicle such as the trading departments of investment
banks or internationally active commercial banks.
Structure
In order to get "pass-through tax treatment" for investors' profits, hedge funds
usually use limited partnerships, limited liability companies, or other vehicles as their
Q 1
structure. Investors and a sponsor or "a general partner," who is usually a manager of
The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
'* Barry Eichengreen et al., supra note 27, at 29.
'^ For example, Soros Fund Management, Tiger Management Corporation, and Steinhardt Management
Company. Hearings 1, supra note 4 (statement of John P. Laware, Member, FED).
"id.
See The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
'U
14
the hedge fund and has a Umited HabiHty through a management company, are
responsible for guiding investment and risk management. Investment managers have
responsibihty for selecting and monitoring traders and investment advisers, and assisting
83
managers.
Characteristics
In general, hedge funds have five characteristics of operation unlike other
investment instruments. First, hedge fimds impose incentive fees according to their
performance. Second, hedge funds usually have excessive and aggressive leverage.
Third, hedge funds seek short-term investment strategies. Fourth, hedge funds are often
established "offshore," i.e., "domiciled outside the United States." Fifth, hedge fund
partners also invest their own money. In short, hedge flinds have unique characteristics
different from mutual funds: "(1) free choice of asset classes, (2) free choice of markets,
OQ
(3) free choice of trading style, and (4) free choice of instruments."
Sophisticated Investors
There are three types of investors in securities regulations: (1) novices, (2)
reasonable investors, and (3) sophisticated investors. Usually wealthy individuals who
have $5 million investment capacity and highly sophisticated institutional investors invest
in hedge funds. These "high net worth" individuals and sophisticated institutions are not
protected by securities regulators due to the belief that they can protect themselves and
present no public policy interest. As sophisticated investors, endowment funds and
*" See Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 69.
*^ See Id
The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix A.
''Id
''^Id
*^ The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
15
pension funds invest in hedge funds, and the proportion of such investors is increasing
because of hedge funds' high returns. When we think about the regulation of hedge
funds, we are confronted with this dilemma: should sophisticated investors be protected
by securities regulation?
Effects outside Hedge Funds
Hedge funds have a great deal of trading with other financial institutions in the
market. Hedge funds use leverage through repurchase agreements (repo), short position,
and derivatives.^^ In order to get short-term return, they also take high-risk, aggressive
speculation in the world financial market. Banks and securities firms can be lenders or
derivatives counterparties. ' The counterparties of hedge funds are confronted with
liquidation problems when hedge funds go bankrupt. Because of wholesale liquidation,
hedge funds' insolvency may bring about severe problems for those banks and securities
firms. Hedge funds' counterparties function as prime brokers, futures clearing firms,
repo and reverse repo counterparties, OTC derivative counterparties, and loan
94
counterparties.
Beverly Chandler, supra note 2, at 5.
^' Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 15.
'^ See The President's Working report, supra note 16.
^' See supra note 2 1 , at 202.
'' See Id.
^^ See Id.
See The President 's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
CHAPTER IV
THE REGULATIONS OF HEDGE FUNDS AND MUTUAL FUNDS
Securities Regulation of Mutual Funds
Registration Requirements
1. Registration
Under the ICA, every investment company is required to register with the
SEC,^^ and the activities of a registered investment company and persons connected with
it are restricted by the ICA. In addition, a variety of SEC and private sanctions are
provided by the ICA. The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) requires every mutual
fund to register its shares.^^ The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) mandates that every
investment company register as a "regulated investment company" for taxation.
2. Reporting Requirement
Mutual funds must disclose information to their investors about their
QO
management, holdings, fees and expenses, and performance. Mutual funds must provide
a prospectus and a shareholder report to investors.^^ The mutual funds' objectives, fees
and expenses, and investment strategies must be stated in the prospectus. '^^ A mutual
funds' performance is reported by annual and semiannual shareholder reports. 101
^' 15U.S.C. §§80a-7to-8.
'^ 15U.S.C. §§77ato77aa.
'^ Victoria E. Schonfeld and Thomas M. J. Kerwin, supra note 61, at 107; I.R.C. § 851 (a).
'* See Dijference between Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds, The Investment Company Institute [hereinafter
Difference] <http://www.ici.org/issues/diff_mutual_hedge_ftind.html>
See Guide, supra note 61, at 24.
"^ See Id.
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Other Restrictions
The advertisements and sales materials of mutual funds are restricted by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). Mutual funds must have
directors who are responsible for extensive oversight of the fund's policies and
procedure; at least forty percent of those directors must be independent of the fund's
management under Section 10(a) of ICA.'^"' The distributors of mutual funds are
regulated as broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act).'°'* In addition, the investment advisers of mutual funds are registered and regulated
by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA).'°^
Securities Regulation of Hedge Funds
Registration Requirements
Usually, hedge funds in the United States use the exemption provision of ICA to
get more flexibility in management. '^'^ Thus, most hedge funds are "private" investment
companies exempted from Section 3 (c) (1) and 3 (c) (7).'^^ In order to use the Section 3
1 0S
(c) (1) exemption, hedge fund securities should not be owned by "more than 100
persons" or use "public offering." '°^ Thus, most hedge funds use private offerings and are
'''See Id.
'°^ Difference, supra note 98.
'°^ 15U.S.C. §80a-10(a).
"^ 15 U.S.C.§78o (a)(1).
'^^ 15U.S.C. §80b-3.
'°^ See The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
'''Id
''^ 15U.S.C. §80 a-3 (c)(1).
'°' The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix A.
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therefore exempt from registration requirements under Section 4 (2) of the Securities
Act"^ or under Regulation D.
Hedge funds are only constrained by "investment agreement" with investors. ' '
'
Before 1996, hedge fimds consisted of one general partner and 99 limited investors. Due
to the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMI), the maximum
numbers of investor rose from 99 to 500. In addition, hedge funds must sell their
securities only to "qualified purchasers" in order to use Section 3(c)(7). The purview of
"qualified purchasers" is as follows: "(1) any natural person who owns not less than $5
million in investments, (2) a family-ovmed company that owns not less $5 million in
investments, (3) certain trusts, and (4) any person who owns and invests on a
1 1 T
discretionary basis not less than $25 million in investments." Section 3(c)(7) was
added to the ICA by the NSMI in 1996.'^'^ The idea behind Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) is
that investors in hedge funds are very small in number and have sufficient investment
experience for their risk. In other words, there is "no significant public interest."
In order to avoid the "public reporting requirements" of the Securities Exchange
Act (Exchange Act), hedge ftmds must have less than 500 shareholders. ^'^ Under Section
15(a) of the Securities Act, hedge funds can be excluded from registration as broker-
I 1 Q
dealers. Hedge funds must also file with the SEC when managers exercise investment
"" 15U.S.C. §77d(2).
'" Difference, supra note 98.
"Ms U.S.C.§80a-3 (c)(7).
113
The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix B; Hearing 2, supra note 17
(testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, SEC).
"'' The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix B; Hal S. Scott and Philip A.
Wellons, International Finance -Transactions, Policy, and Regulation 1061 (1999).
"^ See The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix B.
"^ See Joseph R. Fleming, supra note 57, at 1 184, n 27.
"' The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix B.
"* 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a).
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discretion over accounts having more than $100 million in equity securities. Under
Section 203(b)(3) of the lAA, fund managers can be exempt from investment adviser
registration. Unregulated advisers are regulated by antifraud clause under Section 206
ofthelAA.'^'
Other Restrictions
There are also limitations in the redemption and transferability of partnership
interests. Due to these facts, hedge funds are illiquid investment entities. Hedge fund
investors do not have special government protection because they have sophisticated
knowledge of the financial markets.
According to "large trader and large position reporting systems," hedge funds are
required to submit reports to SEC when they acquire at least 5% of a publicly traded
company's security. The antifraud provisions can regulate hedge funds. Even though
hedge funds are not registered under the ICA, they are regulated by the antifraud sections
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
Regulation in the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)
When a hedge fund trades on U.S. Futures and Option Exchanges or has U.S.
investors, it must be registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
"M5U.S.C. §78m(f).
'^° 15U.S.C. §80b-203(b)(3).
'^' The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, Appendix A.
'^^ See William N. Goetzmann, supra note 21 ; The Task Force on Hedge Funds, Report on Section 3 (c) (1)
ofthe Investment Company Act of1940 and Proposals to Create an Exceptionfor Qualified Purchases, 51
Bus. LAW. 773 (1996).
'^ Congress thought that the hedge funds did not involve "significant public policy issues" and were not
properly subject to federal regulation. See Hearings 1, supra note 4 (statement of John P. Laware, Member,
FED); See Hedge Funds, supra note 70; See Steven Scheer, Hedge Funds Reject Callsfor U.S. Govt.
Regulations, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 1999.
'^^ 15U.S.C. §78m(d).
The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix A.
20
(CFTC) as a commodity pool operator (CPO) under the CEA. The hedge fund is also
regulated as a CPO by the National Futures Association (NFA). The hedge fund must
file its annual financial statements with CFTC Eind NFA. The hedge fund must provide
its investors with copies of annual financial statements and quarterly reporters concerning
its NAV as well as maintain books and records, and include all material disclosures in
offering memoranda to perspective investors.
Remedies
Hedge funds use "private placement," so only a contract regulates dealings
between investors and hedge fund partners except in the case of fraud. Thus, if the
problems caused by hedge funds do not belong to the antifraud provision in the Securities
Act, investors can only get remedies due to the breach of contract or negligence of
trustee.
'^^
Part 30 of the CFTC's regulations.
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See The Task Force on Hedge Funds, supra note 122.
See generally Beverly Chandler, supra note 2, at 182-187.
CHAPTER V
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MUTUAL FUNDS AND HEDGE FUNDS
Regulation
Mutual funds are regulated by the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the rules of
NASD, the ICA, the lAA, and IRC. However, hedge funds are not governed by those
regulations.''^^
Investors and Minimum Investment
There are no restrictions regarding sophistication of investors and minimum
investment amounts to invest in mutual funds. However, with respect to hedge funds,
only sophisticated institutions and wealthy individuals can invest. Additionally, there is a
minimum investment of usually $5 million or more for those investing in hedge funds. '^^
Fees
Investors of mutual fiinds pay an annual fee of approximately 0.24-0.28%,
which is based on the fund's net assets. Mutual funds must disclose fees and
expenses having regulatory limits. In comparison, there is no limitation on
management '^^ and performance or incentive fees'^'* with respect to hedge funds. '^^
'^^ See Difference, supra note 98.
'^° See Hedge Funds, supra note 70.
'^' Mutual funds' fees and expenses should be disclosed in "a fee table" in the front of the funds'
prospectus. See Guide, supra note 61, at 26.
"^ NASD rules.
'^'' Generally, fixed fee: 1-2 percent. William N. Goetzmann, supra note 21.
'^"^ Generally, incentive fee: 10-30 percent, typically 20 percent. Id.
21
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Leverage
Securities regulations regulate a mutual funds' ability to leverage and borrow
money. The ICA limits the issuance of senior securities as an "asset coverage test," and
mutual funds' investments in illiquid assets must be limited to 15 percent of net assets.
Additionally, the regulations require disclosure investment policies of mutual funds to
investors. However, hedge funds are not subject to restrictions pertaining to leveraging
and their policies. Leverage can be restricted "only by the willingness of [the hedge
fluids'] creditors and counterparties to provide it." In typical hedge funds, a balance-
sheet leverage ratio is less than two to one
139
Liquidity
Mutual funds must value their daily portfolio and calculate their daily
prices. However, there are no restrictions about investors' redemption and no regulations
about their portfolio valuation and price calculation with respect to hedge funds.
'^^ See Guide, supra note 61, at 26.
The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
See Guide, supra note 61, at 26.
'^^ The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix A.
'''See Id
136
137
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See Guide, supra note 61, at 26.
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Table 1: The difference between hedgefunds and mutualfunds
Hedge Funds Mutual Funds
Regulations -None -The Securities Act of 1933
-The Securities Exchange Act of
1934
-The Investment Company Act of
1940
-The Investment Advisers Act of
1940
-The National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. rules
Investors -Sophisticated, high net-worth
investors
(Wealthy individuals or
sophisticated financial
institutions)
- About 63 million Americans
Minimum
investment
-At least $5 million -$1,000 or less
Fee system and
disclosure
-Administrative fee (1-2%)
-Incentive fee (20% or more)
-no limitation and disclosure on
fee system
-Administrative fee(0.24-28%)
-Limitation and disclosure on fee
system
Leverage -Often used -Restriction on leverage and
borrowing money
Investment
policies
-Do not disclose -Disclose
Pricing -No rule on valuation or pricing -Compute pricing on daily basis
Liquidity -Restriction on redemption -Redemption shares on at least
daily basis
Antifraud
provision
-Applicable -Applicable
Disclosure -No disclosure on holdings,
performance
-Depend on voluntary
agreement
-Disclosure on management,
holdings, fees and expenses, and
performance
Source: data from
The Vangi
Investment Company Institute ,http://www.ici.org/issues/diff_mutual_hecige_fund.html.;
uard Group, Inc. <http://www.vanguard.com/cgi-bin/Newprint/908307468>
CHAPTER VI
HEDGE FUND FRAUD AND DEBACLES
Manhattan Investment Fund Fraud Case
Review
On January 18, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accused
Michael W. Berger,'"" a hedge fund adviser of securities fraud.^"*^ The SEC also charged
Manhattan Investment Fund Ltd. (MIF)*'*^ and Manhattan Capital Management Inc.'"^"*
Berger established MIF which had a $250,000 minimum investment, a 1 percent
management fee, and a 20 percent incentive fee in April 1996.'"*^ He raised more than
$500 million from about 280 investors. ^"^^ Most investors were European banks and
institutions, and only eight investors had U.S. addresses.*"*^
Berger and MIF had been concealing huge losses since September 1996. They
inflated MIF's assets and returns even though MIF lost $300 million by betting against
''" Berger, the general manager and founder, is a 29-year-old Austrian who immigrated to America in the
early 1990s.
''*'^ SEC, SEC Charges Hedge Fund and Its Adviser With Fraud Emergency ReliefOrdered, Litigation
Release No. 16412 (Jan. 19,2000). <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lrl6412.htm> Berger, MIF, and
Manhattan Capital Management Inc. were charged with "violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933 and SectionlO (b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." In addition, Berger and
Manhattan Capital Management Inc. were charged with "violations of Section 206(1) and (2) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940." Id.
'"'^An offshore hedge fund organized and managed by Berger and was a British Virgin Islands corporation.
Bear Stems was the fund's clearing broker. Financial Asset Management was the introducing broker. Fund
Administration Services (Bermuda) Ltd., an affiliate of Ernst & Young Bermuda, was an administrator.
''*'* An offshore hedge fund that operates out ofNew York. SEC Investigating Hedge Fundfor Possible
Misrepresentation, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 19, 2000, at 4.
'''^ Manhattan Investment Fund 'No Malicious Wrongdoing' Claims Berger, Mar/Hedge (Jan. 17, 2000).
<http://www.marhedge.com>
'"^ A marketing firm in Paris raised much of the fund's capital from wealthy European investors. See
Mitchell Pacelle, Deals & Deal Makers: Hedge Fund Faces Scrutiny in SEC Probe, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
2000, at CI 7.
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high-flying Internet stocks. They paid more money than the real shares' value to
investors who wanted to redeem their investments in order to hide MIF's huge losses.
Furthermore, Berger informed investors that MIF gained 15 percent in 1996, 30 percent
in 1997, 12 percent in 1998, and 14 percent in 1999*'*'^ and had over $427 million in
assets as of August 31,1999.^^^ In fact, this was untrue: the net market value that day
was in fact $27.9 million, and its assets were less than $50 million.'^'
Because Berger thought that market and Internet-related stocks were overvalued,
he sold Internet stocks short with hope that those stocks would decline. However, the
prices of many Internet stocks increased. Because the losses, $300 million, were huge, he
made fake account statements under the name of Financial Asset Management, an
introducing broker, even though his clearing broker. Bear Stems Cos. Inc.(BSC), sent
correct account statements. ^ The phony account statements that "materially overstated
the performance and value" were provided to his fund's investors, potential investors, the
fiind's administrator, and the fund's auditor, Deloitte & Touche's Bermuda affiliate.'^"*
When Berger sent false information to the auditor, he reprogrammed his fax
machine to make it look as though the information had been sent by Financial Asset
SEC Probes Hedge Fund: Manhattan Investment Fund's Profit Reports Subject ofSEC Investigation,
CNNfn, Jan. 18,2000.
Fund Manager Accused ofFraud; Investment: SEC Says $300 million in Losses on Internet Stocks Was
hiddenfrom Investors, L. A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2000, at 6 [hereinafter Fw^of Manager].
'"" Mitchell Pacelle, supra note 146.
'^'^ SEC, 5M;7ra note 142.
'^" Mitchell Pacelle, Deal & Deal Makers: Fund Manager Concocted Fraud, SEC Suit Alleges, WALL St.
J., Jan. 19, 2000, atC24.
'^^ See Fund Manager, supra note 148; he felt that many opportunities on the short position. See Mitchell
Pacelle, supra note 146.
153
Mitchell Pacelle, supra note 151
See SEC Charges Hedge Fund: Alleges Manhattan Investment Fund Gave False Statements to
Investors, CNNFN, Jan. 19, 2000; Deloitte & Touche resigned recently and withdrew its approval of three
years' financial reports from 1996 to 1998.
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Management. '^^ Even though the administer and the auditor also received accurate
information from BSC, Berger advised the ftind's administer and auditor to ignore BSC's
information because it did not reflect the hedge fund's entire portfolio. '^^ The fund was
operated as a "Ponzi scheme": old investors who redeemed their shares earlier were paid
out more than their share value from capital raised from new investors through Berger'
s
1 en
phony statements concerning the performance and value of MIF.
Problem
Berger lied to his investors about MIF's worth: he did not disclose his huge losses
by betting Internet-related stocks. This case clearly indicates that MIF did not report its
true financial condition to its investors. In addition, due to fake account statements, MIF
was able to get more investors. Furthermore, the misrepresentation started in 1 996 with
the creation of fictitious account statements. Berger misrepresented the fund's financial
condition to its independent auditor. The auditor believed Berger' s statements without a
doubt.
Berger admitted that "there have been substantial losses in the fund over the last
few years, and the statements on performance were inaccurate." In addition, he
confessed that " I don't expect anyone to like me. I feel bad about the entire situation."
However, he did justify his behavior by saying that "I made mistakes, but I haven't stolen
anything. The intention of what I did wasn't bad."'^^
In my view, his actions were very harmful because his thoughts did not focus on
the notion of trust, transparency, and the protection of investors. Probably, he only
'^' Manhattan Investment Fund, Mar/HedGE (Jan. 19, 2000). <http://www.marhedge.com>
'^^
Id.
'''Id
"^ Mitchell Pacelle, supra note 146.
27
concentrated on making profits without considering good methods. He just wanted to get
excellent results with flexible management of money. If he had told the truth to his
investors, they would not have invested their money. Berger was aware of that, thus, he
did not report the truth to his investors.
According to BSC's statement, BSC noticed Berger's misrepresentation "when an
investor contacted [BSC] seeking to verify a reported strong performance for the fund,
where [BSC] reports have, for the few years, indicated significant losses. "'^*^ This
statement explains that the disclosure and investor protections are problems. It means
that investors did not receive the true financial statements from the fund's auditor.
This case also indicates that MIF had problems in "mark-to-market practice"
which is used in hedge funds to prohibit the hiding of losses and encourage the proper
resolution of problems.'^' In sum, this case demonstrates that the main problems in hedge
funds are transparency, disclosure, the role of the independent outside auditor, and an
independent regulation system. In order to solve those problems, it is necessary to
regulate hedge funds with respect to disclosure and transparency.
'^^ Jaye Scholl, Boom! A Bet Against Stocks Blows up Fund, BARRON'S 27 (Jan. 17, 2000).
'^° Manhattan Investment Fund, Mar/HEDGE (Jan. 18, 2000). <http://www.marhedge.com>
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Hedge Funds Debacles
Askin Capital Management (ACM)
1. Review
In 1994. three hedge funds—Granite Corp.. Granite Partners Limited Partnership,
and Quartz Hedge Fund—managed by David Askin in New York, with assets of $2
billion, collapsed due to high leverage.'" Askin lost more than $570 million.'"
Askin had achieved good returns from his management of two Granite funds
(Granite Corp. and Granite Partners) in 1992: 21.8 percent in Granite Corp. and 21.15
percent in Granite Partners.'"^ After that, he established ACM in January 1993 and
acquired Granite Corp. and Granite Partners. "'" He offered a "market-neutral" investment
strategy that made him attractive to sophisticated investors in Wall Street and Europe. "^^
He wanted to get at least 15 percent annual return "'^according to one private placement
memorandum. '^^
However, he did not follow the strategy and appeared over-leveraged and
underhedged.'^' He borrowed $2.50 per dollar that he invested in his funds '^" in order to
"'' See The President 's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
'" Saul Hansell, Investment Funds are Liquidated, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 1994, at Dl ; "Lehman
Government Securities Inc. accused four of failing to meet a series of margin calls after sharp losses,
totaling $6.6million, by the Askin funds."" Michael Siconolfi, Tumble in Mortgage Securities Sparks
Lawsuit, Wall St. J., April 8, 1994, at CI.
'" Jack Willoughby, Askin Examiner Will Study Street 's Role in Collapse, INVESTMENT DEALERS-
DIGEST 8 (July 25, 1994).
'^^ Barry B. Burr, Firm Targets Mortgage Securities, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, 30 (Feb. 22, 1993).
'''Id
'''' Jaye Scholl, How Did Askin Really Collapse' Barrons 20 (May 9, 1994).
'^' See Barry B. Burr, supra note 164.
See Jack Willoughby, Askin Fund Assessor: Granite Appeared Unhedged, Over-Leveraged,
INVESTMENT DEALERS" DIGEST 8 (May 23, 1994).
'"' Id
Hearings /, supra note 4 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) ; Because of this failure, SEC
and the President's Working Group on Financial Markets reviewed the structure and activity of hedge
funds and released a report, "An Assessment of Developments with Potential Implications for Market Price
Dynamics and Systemic Risk." Hearing!, supra note 17 (testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, SEC).
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enhance the investments' returns.'^' He leveraged approximately $2 billion with $600
million.'''^ Because of increasing interest rates, he cleared his funds through "fire sales"
on March 31, 1994.'^^ His funds' losses were increased by the high leverage.'^'*
After two brokerage firms, the funds' debtors, filed lawsuits on April 7, 1994, he
submitted "Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy."
'^^
In a six-week period, he had huge losses of 35%
($165 million of $470 million of capital).'^ His instrument was "risk-balanced mortgage-
backed securities which consisted of being long interest-only (lOs) and long principal-
1 77 1 78
only strips (POs)," and he gained great profits for four years without fault.
His funds' debacle came from an investment strategy which did not fit increasing
interest rates, and he was confronted with "the liquidity squeeze" because he could not
satisfy margin calls for his leverage positions. In other words, because his funds' value
dropped within fast a few months, he sold off fund holdings at a loss to satisfy margin
calls. Because of that, he could not recover his losses. He concealed the actual losses
of Granite Partners to his investors in February 1994 in order to escape redemption.'^'
Because of ACM's collapse, some investment banks which had financed his
mortgage derivatives trades had severe losses: for example, the financial exposure of
'^' Jaye Scholl, supra note 166. This news also handled investors' difficulties in appointing an examiner
instead of a trustee to investigate funds' history from April 1993 to March 28, 1994; the U.S. Bankruptcy
court appointed Goldin as a trustee to compromise "between Askin and his investors on one side, and the
Wall Street firms." Jaye Scholl, Goldin Compromise, BARRON'S 14 (June 6, 1994).
'''Id.
'^^ Saul Hansen, supra note 162; Brett D. Fromson, Hedge' Fund Falls Victim to Downturn, WASH. POST,
April 1, 1994, at F8.
'"'''
See Paul G. Barr, Firms Profitfrom Askin Fallout, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS 3 (May 2, 1994).
'"'^
Saul Hansen, Facing Suits, Askin Funds Seek Chapter 11 Protection, N. Y. TIMES, April 8, 1994, at D2;
Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 50-51
.
'^^ Laura Jereski, Cracks Appear in Granite Partners Fund, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1994, at C 1
.
'^^ Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 50-5 1
.
'''Id.
'''Id.
'*° Hearings 1, supra note 4 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC)
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Kidder, Peabody Group Inc.'^"^ to ACM was about $200 million. '^^ Securities firms had a
"symbiotic relationship" with ACM, which means that Askin was "a leading buyer of
Wall Street's 'nuclear waste'" to give some benefits to securities firms, and because of
that, he received some help from the firms in inflating returns to his investors early in
1994. The creditors of the Granite Partners Funds were Kidder Peabody, Lehman
Brothers, Donaldson Lufkin Jenrette, Morgan Stanley, Merill Lynch, Nomura Securities,
Salomon Brothers, Smith Barney, and UBS Securities. '^^
On May 23, 1995, Askin accepted SEC charges of engaging in misleading and
fraudulent conduct to his investors, and agreed to a two-year suspension from securities
industry and a fine
,
which would be placed in escrow to compensate former clients of
ACM.^^^
2. Problem
In the ACM case, Askin promised investors that he would keep liquidity high and
portfolio leverage low by buying only high-quality mortgage securities that had been
thoroughly analyzed. However, he broke his promises. In addition, he concealed the
'^' See The actual loss was 2 1 .89 percent in Feb. 1994, but he disclosed that the loss was 1.5 percent that
month. See Laura Jereski, supra note 176.
'*^
"The biggest player in the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) area and the one with the largest
collaterized mortgage obligation (CMO) inventory." Elisa Herr, Revaluation ofMBS Holdings Leaves Pain
and Opportunity, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST 15 (Apr. 25, 1994).
'^^ Michael Siconolfi, Kidder Discloses Scam in Bonds, Fires Top Trader— It Sets $350 Million Charge,
Says Scheme Involved Government-Strip Deals, WALL ST. J., April 18, 1994, at A3; Michael Siconolfi,
Kidder Had Major Exposure in Collapse ofAskin, Jett Is Said to Have Told U.S. WALL ST. J., July 27,
1994, B2; Marion Merill Dow had $1 1 million loss and sued ACM that had allegedly mismanaged
Marison's derivative contracts. Donna Rosato, Trading Losses Take Toll, B2, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 1994,
atB2.
'^^ Gary Weiss, The $700 Million Mystery, BUSINESS WEEK 76 (Dec. 18, 1995).
'^^ Jack Willoughby, supra note 163.
'^^ Kenneth N. Gilpin, Founder ofAskin Capital Agrees to Settlement ofSEC Charges, N. Y. TIMES, May
24, 1995, at D8; Laura Jereski, David Askin Settles SEC Proceedings Accusing Him ofFraudulent Conduct,
Wall St. J., May 24, 1995, at B5.
'*^ Jack Willoughby, Investors in Askin Funds Sue Streetfor $700 Mil, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST 3
(April 1, 1996).
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actual losses to investors. This case indicates the importance of transparency, risk
management, and investor protection. In particular, high leverage was the main reason
for this debacle.
Argonaut Capital Management (ARCM)
1. Review
The value of ARCM in New York went down 28 percent between January and
July of 1994.'**^ ARCM was managed by David Gerstenharber and Barry Bausano, former
managers of Tiger Management (Tiger): Gerstenharber was "an economist by training,"
and Bausano was "an [executor] of Gerstenhaber's concepts" at Tiger."*" They made good
returns: 45 percent in 1991, 23 percent in 1992, and 61 percent in 1993.'""
ARCM raised an investment of $400 million within just a few weeks in the
summer of 1 993 despite having a 2 percent management fee (compared with a 1 percent
in most hedeg funds), a 20 percent incentive fee. and a $5 million minimum
investment.'"' But, ARCM lost $110 million in 1994 from the initial $400 million
invested, and investors withdrew approximately $225 million and left $65 million in
ARCM.'"- After Bausano left ARCM, Gerstenhaber managed ARCM with $50 million'"'
(returning 31.5 percent gains to his U.S. investors and 65.1 percent gains to offshore
investors in 1996), and at last, he joined in Soros Fund Management.'"^
'^'^ Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 51-52.
Laura Jereski, Argonaut Hedge Fund Loses Its Luster; One Founder Resigns as Losses Mount, WALL
St. J., Aug. 11, 1994, at A.
'"'^ Stephen Taub, The Hedge Rows of Wall Street, FINANCIAL WORLD 38 (Sept. 13, 1994).
'"' Laura Jereski, supra note 189.
'^- Id ; Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 5 1-52 ; Stephen Taub, supra note 190; Laura Jereski, Argonaut
Fund Capital Shrinks after Big Losses, Wali Si. J., Aug. 1 7, 1 994, at C.
'"' Caroline, Waxier, Oil's Well, FORBES 202 (Feb. 10, 1997).
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2. Problem
In this case, there was no breach ot contract, but we can see the importance of risk
management because ARCM had huge losses within a short period.
Vairocana Ltd.
1. Review
David de Jongh Weill'"' managed Vajra Fund, Dorje Fund, and some managed
accounts in London."*' He managed these funds excellently for si.x years with good
records, averaging 36 percent annual gains. '"^ In particular, while he was managing $1 .2
billion in 1993. he returned 63 percent profit to investors compared to about 55 percent in
1992."' The funds' assets grew to $75 billion at the end of 1993, compared to $200
million at the end of 1992.""
He and his wife, an ex-options trader, managed the fund with his eight staff.-"" His
original strategy of investment was "interest rate neutral yield-curve arbitrage strategies
with European bonds."'"' He, however, changed investment strategy without giving
notice to his investors and had stated betting on European interest rates with a 1 to 1
Robert Bonte-Friedheim and Laura Jereski, Hedge-Fund Group ofGeorge Soros Hires Gerstenhaher,
Wall Si. J., Oct. 2, 1997, B 1 9.
' He was bom in Atlanta and is an ardent Buddhist and 36 years old. Vairocana is Sanskrit for "the great
conqueror," and Dorje is "thunderbolt" in Tibetan. While he studied at the University of Georgia, he also
learned "volatile interest- rate futures on an almost -daily basis" on an account at Merrill Lynch. Laura
Jereski, The Wrong Stuff: Good Connections Put Hedge Fund in Business But a Bad Bet Sank It —
Manager David Weill, Suave and Impressive, Drew in Europe 's Wealthy Class — Adieu to a Gilded World.
Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1 994, at A I
.
'"^ Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 52
' Laura Jereski, 5;//7A-a note 195.
""* Id
'''Id
""' Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 52.
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leverage.-"- Initially, he achieved large gains through huge leverage, but over a few
months in 1994. he lost $700 million from his initial investment of $1 .2 bilhon. i.e.. in a
seven months, he lost 60 percent of the initial investment (he lost 20 percent just in
August).-"'
His investors could not receive a correct Net Asset Value (NAV) because his
investment position was too complex to calculate it.-"^His investors withdrew their
investments from the fund; thus, he disposed of all remaining positions and cleared the
two funds.-"' He also concealed his losses from his investors: he reported on May 27,
1994 that he had lost 3 percent for the month. -"^ However, a few days later, the auditor
found a 1 7 percent decline during May. Furthermore, he charged his year-end bonus on
the basis of on the valuation of March 31,1 994.-"^
2. Problem
This case indicates the risk of high leverage in the financial market. In addition,
there was a lack of disclosure to investors.
Fenchurch Capital Management (FCM)-"^
1. Review
FCM, a subsidiary of United Kingdom investment bank Kleinwort Benson and a
commodity-trading adviser and investment-fund operator, was organized in Chicago in
1985.-"'' The Fenchurch Gamma fund (Gamma fund), a listing fund on the Dublin stock
exchange, gained 23 percent annual returns in 1985 and for a five-year period continued
-"; Id.
^"^
Id; Laura Jereski. supra note 1 95.
-"''
Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 52.
'-''
Id.
^"^ Laura Jereski, supra note 195.
2"' Id
34
to be the highest-performing. Marcus A. Hutchins, a president and chief trader of
FCM, returned 17 percent profits to his investors for 1992 with $111 million under
management.
In 1994, FCM managed $650 million with leverages of up to approximately $30
billion in arbitrage positions and earned 1 5 percent in the first eight months of 1 994 with
"relative value trades" in the fixed-income instruments. Investors were insurance
companies, non-U.S. banks, pension funds, wealthy individuals, and fund of funds
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managers.
At the beginning of 1995, FCM managed $700 million in the Gamma fund and in
Fenchurch Beta Fund Limited Partnership (Beta fund), having increased from $350
million in 1994 and $150 million in 1993. ' Thus, FCM was one of the fastest-growing
American hedge funds fi-om 1992 to 1994.^'^
On June 1, 1995, Marcus Hutchins reported to investors that FCM fell 1 1.5
percent in May. FCM dropped about seven percent in one day of September 1995,
declined 22 percent within that month, and was down dunng nine months in 1995.
7 1 7Gamma fund and Beta fund declined 41 percent between March and November 1995
^°^ Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 52-53.
^°^ Miriam Bensman, Psst, We're Market-Neutral, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 37 (Jan. 1995).
'''Id.
^" Ginger Szala, Fenchurch Spreads Profits as Other Managers Retrench, FUTURES 58 (July 1992).
^'^ Defying the Odds, FORTUNE 84 (Oct. 17, 1994); Miriam Bensman, supra note 209.
'''Id
^''' Andrew Bary, Trading Points: Floating Like a Butterfly, Fund Gets Stung By a Bee, BARRON'S MW12
(June 26, 1995).
'''Id
"^ Robert Bonte-Friedheim and Michael R. Robert, Fenchurch 's Highflying ChiefCrashes as Its Global-
Bond Funds Take a Dive, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1995, at A; Michael R. Sesit, Despite '95 Rally in Global
Bond Markets, Many Traders Aren 't Reaping Rewards, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13,1 995, at C 1
.
^'^ Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 52.
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because they had huge losses in "a German yield-curve trade and a German-French
interest-rate arbitrage."
FCM lost $1,264 million within eight months of that year. Because investors
pulled out their money, the total assets ofFCM decreased from $1,403 billion to $139
-) 1 Q "770
million within eight months'" and dropped to only about $75million in 1996. In
particular, the manager of the fund changed the hedge fiind strategy without notifying the
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mvestors.
2. Problem
In this case, there were several problems: high leverage, lack of disclosure, and
lack of investor protection.
Comments
Table 2 shows common problems of hedge funds such as lack of disclosure, high
leverage, and change of investment strategy without notice. With respect to disclosure,
MIF made phony account statements, and ACM and Vairocana both concealed the real
losses to their investors. FCM did not disclose its change in investment strategy to its
investors. Those facts indicated that there is problem in disclosure and in investor
protection. ACM, Vairocana, and FCM used high leverage, which amplified their losses.
On the other hand, huge losses in hedge funds occurred quickly over a few months. This
means that even if a hedge fund was returning good profits, it could suffer a huge loss
^'* Andrew Bary, Trading Points: After Some Good Years, Euro Bond Market Batters Some Big Investors,
BARRON'S MW12 (Oct.2, 1995).
^'^ Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 52-53.
^^° Andrew Bary, Trading Points: Fenchurch Affair: Troublefor the Repo Market? BARRON'S MWl 1 (July
15, 1996).
^^' Id
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within short period of time. In short, compounding the problem, there were disclosure
problems for investors, and the funds were too highly leveraged.
Table 2: Hedgefunds 'fraud and debacles (M: Million)
MIF ACM ARCM Vairocana FCM
Principals Michael W. David Askin Gerstenharb David de Marcus A.
Berger er / Bausano Jongh Weill Hutchins
Main Office New York New York New York London Chicago
Losses $300M $570M $110M $700M $1,264M
Disclosure Made phony Concealed - Concealed Did not
account the actual the actual disclose
statements losses losses strategy
change
Leverage - High - High High
leverage leverage leverage
Investment - Market- - Interest-rate -
strategy neutral
Did not
follow the
strategy
neutral yield
curve
Source: data from the summary of this chapter.
CHAPTER VII
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT EPISODE
Review
Establishment
LTCM was started with $1.01 billion capital in February 1994 by former Salomon
Brothers' vice president John Meriweather and other partners, including two Nobel prize
winners, Myron Sholes and Robert Merton, and U.S. Federal Reserve former vice-
999 99^
chairman David Mullins. In particular, it was managed by 25 Ph.D.s. LTCM was a
"Delaware limited partnership" whose main office was located in Connecticut.
However, the name "Long-Term" which translates into "patience" or "patiently
trading"^^^ does not match the characteristics of hedge funds because they usually take
"short-term investment strategies."
Structure and Development
997LTCM was one of the biggest hedge funds in the world due to "its assemblage
of talent in pricing and trading financial instruments" and "its large initial capital
^^^ Nicholas Dunbar, INVESTING MONEY- THE STORY LONG-TERM Capital Management and The
Legends Behind It xi-xii (2000); David Mullins joined in summer and was not partner at the outset.
Merrill Lynch & Co., Long-Term Capital, LP., Private Placement ofLimited Partnership Interests, 1, 16-
17 (Oct. 1, 1993).
""^Michael Siconolfi et al., All Bets are off: How the Salesmanship and Brainpower Failed at Long - Term
Capital, Wall ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at Al.
^"''
(1) Fund was a newly formed Delaware Limited Partnership. (2) Portfolio com. was a newly formed
Delaware Limited Liability Company. (3) Long-Term Capital Mangement Inc. was a Delaware
Corporation. Merrill Lynch & Co., supra note 222, at 1, 3; In the Report of The President's Working Group
on Financial markets, Long-Term Capital Portfolio L.P. was a Cayman Islands partnership. But see The
President's Working Group Report, supra note 16 ; But see Nicholas Dunbar, supra note 217, at 126.
-^' Living large, GRANT'S INTEREST RATE OBSERVER (Nov. 5, 1993).
<http://wysiwyg://4/http://www.grantspub.com/dispatch/000 1 .html>
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stake. "'^^^ It raised its capital with "a private offering of limited partnership interests"
through its placement agent, Merrill Lynch & Co. Figure 1 shows the structure of i
LTCM.
Figure 1: LTCM Structure
Long-Term Capital
Management L.P. (LTCM)
- General Partner of Fund
- Investment Manager of
Portfolio Com.
Source: data from Merrill Lynch & Co., Long-Term Capital, L.P., Private Placement of Limited
Partnership Interests, 1 (Oct. 1, 1993).
Its investment strategy was to get gains from "discrepancies in the relative value
of government bonds, fixed-income derivatives, equities and equity derivatives primarily
in the U.S., Japanese, and European markets."230
^* 77?^ President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix A; LTCM was the largest hedge
funds by asset size in 1996. Beverly Chandler, supra note 2, at 126.
227
228
229
230
See Philipp Cottier, supra note 22, at 26, Table 2-4.
Hearings /, supra note 4 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, FED).
See Merrill Lynch & Co., supra note 222.
Outlook Dec. 1998. supra note 18, at III, 54, Box 3.4.
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Table 3 shows that LTCM was a unique hedge fund in the industry: (1 ) it had a
three-year redemption restriction; (2) its high minimum investment was $10 million; and
(3) it had a 2 percent annual management fee on the assets basis and a 25 percent
performance fee on the profits basis.
Table 3: Comparison between LTCM, Common Hedge funds, and Mutual Funds
LTCM Common Hedge
Funds
Mutual Funds
Minimum
investment
$10 million $5 million $1,000 or less
Fees Administrative :2%
Incentive: 25%
Administrative: 1-1
.
5%
Incentive: 15-25%
Administrative: 1 .24
%
Restriction on
redemption
Three years Quarterly or Yearly Daily
Source: data from summary.
LTCM wanted to "[suck] up nickels from all over the world" but failed. In
addition, Scholes answered with pride to a question from a potential LTCM investor that
"[a]s long as there continue to be people like you, [it will] make money."
Near Bankruptcy
LTCM returned about $2.7 billion to its investors at the end of 1997, made its
capital $ 4.8 billion, but did not reduce its leverage size.^^"^ LTCM managed about $120
billion in balance sheet positions. Its leverage ratio was 25-times its capital but later
231
232
233
Michael Siconolfi et al., supra note 223; Merrill Lynch & Co., supra note 222, at 2, 4-5.
Michael Siconolfi et al., Id.
Id.
The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16, at Appendix A.
"^ Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 1 8, at III, 54, Box 3.4; But see Meriwether insisted that "LTCM's
leverage was not excessive." Nicholas Dunbar, supra note 222, at 226.
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236became 100 times its capital due to LTCM's decline. LTCM had "a notional value" of
about $1.25 trillion- 1,000 times its capital-in derivatives positions.
Huge losses were incurred during August and September 1998. According to
Meriwether's letter to his investors on September 2, 1998, LTCM had $2.5 billion in
losses.^^^ In particular, the $2.1 billion losses happened only in August. '^^ LTCM's
capital was $4.1 billion on August 1, 1998 and $2.3 billion by September 1, 1998 (the '
leverage ratio became 50 times its capital). "*' After 16 days, its capital dropped to
$1.5billion and at last fell to $600 million (the leverage ratio became 167 times its
capital) on September 23, 1998.^'*^ LTCM lost 90 percent of its equity within only 55
days.^^^
These enormous losses could possibly have disrupted or weakened the
international financial market, i.e., the meltdown ofLTCM could have caused "a global
systemic crisis that could [have harmed] financial institutions and investors worldwide,
given the size and extent of [its] positions."'^'*^ For this reason, FRBNY intervened to
solve the problem even though LTCM was a private limited partnership. '^
'^^ Brooksley Bom, Regulatory Responses to Risks in the OTC Derivatives Market, Comm. on Federal
Regulation of Securities ABA Section of Business Law (Nov. 13, 1998)
<http://www.cftc.gov/opayspeeches/bom-40.htm>
'''Id.
^'^ Hearings 2, supra note 17 (testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, SEC).
David Shirreff, Lessons From the Collapse ofHedge Fund, Long-Term Capital Management (IFCI).
<http://wwrw.risk;.ifci.ch/146520.html>
'''Id.
^'" Steve Mufson, Fund's Big Betters Learned That Risk Trumps Math, History, WASH. POST, Sept. 27,
1998, at HOI; Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 18, at III, 55, Box 3.4.
^"•^ Steve Mufson, Id; Outlook Dec. 1998 Id
'""' Steve Mufson, Id\ Outlook Dec. 1998 Id.
'^ See Hearings 3, supra note 10 (testimony of Brooksley Bom, Chairperson, CFTC); See Outlook Dec.
1998, supra note 18, at 111, 54, Box 3.4.
'^^ Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa Vinci§
Futures & Derivatives L. Rep. (Feb. 1999).
'"^^ One general partner has unlin
Cottier, supra note 22, at 56, 60.
guerra, Regulation in the Wake ofLong-Term Capital's Rescue,
Y
mited liability, and multiple limited partners have limited liability. Phillipp
K I
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Rescue Plan
On September 28, 1998, a $3.6 billion bailout package ofLTCM was planned by
a consortium of fourteen major international financial institutions including global
commercial and investment banks which were LTCM's counterparties, creditors, and
investors.
^'*'' The rescue package was as follows: (1) eleven institutions^"^*^ took equity
stakes of $300 million in LTCM; (2) two institutions^"*^ took stakes of $125 million; and
(3) one institution took a stake of $ 1 00 million. Furthermore, Union Bank of
Switzerland (UBS) wrote down its original equity stake in LTCM of $685 million.'^^'
Through a bailout plan, the consortium owned 90 percent equity in LTCM.
After the bailout ofLTCM, those institutions had a hard time. In October 1998,
the stock price of Merrill Lynch fell 75 percent, compared to the beginning price of
jQ^g 233 QqIj^j^^j^ Sachs postponed its IPO.'^^'* The stock price of Lehman Brothers
declined 60 percent, and, as a result, the company suffered from bankruptcy rumors.
In December 1 999, after LTCM repaid its consortium members, LTCM was
closed.^^^ However, some investors still have losses.^^'
" They are creditors of LTCM, and some of them are LTCM's swaps counterparties. Hearings 2, supra
note 17 (testimony of Brooksley Bom, Chairperson, CFTC).
^'*^ Banker's Trust, Barclays, Chase Manhattan, Credit Suisse, First Boston, Deutsche Bank, J.P. Morgan,
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Travelers, and Union Bank of Switzerland.
'^^ Societe Generale and Lehman Brothers.
"'' Paribas
^^^Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 18, at III, 54, Box 3.4.
Hearings /, supra note 4 (testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, SEC)
^^^ Nicholas Dunbar, supra note 222, at 225.
'''Id.
'''Id.
"^ Trillion Dollar Bet, PBS TV(Feb 8. 2000) [hereinafter Trillion Dollar Bet].
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbhynovaytranscripts>
'''Id
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The Failure of Economic Genius
The LTCM episode indicated again the failure case of "economic genius" in the
financial world, which means there were gaps between the academic field and the real
business field.
The LTCM episode is not the first time that economic genius has tripped
over market reality. Irving Fisher, the great American economist, managed
Yale's endowment portfolio in the 1920s and is said to have lost much of it
in the crash of 1929. In the early 1920s, John Maynard Keynes lost his wealth
speculating in foreign exchange, and was saved from bankruptcy by family
and friends. '^^
The UBS Fiasco
UBS, the biggest loser, wrote off $685 million in LTCM. The transaction
system between UBS and LTCM was as follows: (1) in June, August, and October 1997,
UBS sold "the right to the managers of [LTCM] to buy fi-om UBS a fixed number of
shares" in LTCM^^'; (2) the seven-year European call option could be operated in 2004;
(3) in order to hedge its position, UBS bought shares in LTCM to the value of $800
million; and (4) additionally, UBS invested $266 million in LTCM.^^^
Due to the good returns of LTCM, UBS risk managers never considered the
possibility of a collapse of LTCM which would have left them with a large degree of
exposure. Because of this failure, the chairman ofUBS Board of Directors resigned.
Throughout 1997, UBS discussed with the partners of LTCM a structured transaction
^^* See George H. Borts, Building a Better Hedge Fund (Brown University Faculty Governance).
<http://facgov.brown.edu/facgov/facbulletin/March99Issue/borts.html>
'''Id.
^^° David Shirreff, supra note 239.
^^' UBS, The LTCM Dealing (UBS news) <http:// www.ubs.com/e/index.htm>; David Shirreff, Id.
'^' UBS, Id; David Shirreff, Id; Scholes devised this transaction. Michael Siconolfi et al., supra note 223.
^*^ See David Shirreff, supra note 239.
',• '1.
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together with an investment in the shares of the fund. UBS had been interested in
acquiring a stake in LTCM.
LTCM was seen by the investment community as a successful and well managed
fund which had consistently produced outstanding returns for its investors. UBS and
LTCM agreed to enter into a series of transactions on the understanding that a proprietary
investment in the fund could be made by UBS. There were two restrictions to the overall
transaction. Investors in LTCM were required to commit to an initial investment period
of three years. Additionally, restrictions were imposed by the managers on the hedged
shares. This made UBS' investment extremely sensitive to a drop in the value of the
.,.
fiind. Losses by the fund left UBS with a significant writedown in its LTCM
investments. In sum, UBS Chief Executive Officer confessed in a disclosure that " [a]t no
time was this structure justifiable from a risk/return perspective."
In particular, Switzerland's Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) examined
UBS' Global Equity Derivatives Business unit.^^^After that, the SFBC ordered UBS to
"take organizational actions with respect to internal controls." After the LTCM was
already near-bankruptcy, however, UBS disclosed the huge losses. If SFBC had
investigated more carefully, the huge losses ofUBS would have been reduced or escaped.
^^ Nicholas Dunbar, supra note 222, at 226.
Hearing /, supra note 4 (written testimony of Henry T. C. Hu, Professor of Law, University of Texas).
""'Id.
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Other Losers
Due to LTCM's near bankruptcy, its investors also had losses like its
counterparties. Table 4 shows other losers and their losses. In particular, St. Jones
University Endowment Fund and University of Pittsburgh invested in the LTCM.
Table 4: Investors and losses (M: Million)
Name Amount(USD) Notes
Liechtenstein Global Trust 30 M
Bank of Italy lOOM
Credit Suisse 55M
UBS 685M
Merrill Lynch 22M Employees' deferred
payment
Donal Marron lOM Chairman of Paine Webber
Sandy Weill lOM Co-CEO Citicorp
Mckinsey executives lOM
Bear Stems executives 20M
Dresdner Bank 145M
Sumitomo Bank lOOM
Prudential Life Corp. 5.43M
Bank Julius Baer N.R.(Not Reported) Clients' investment
Republic National Bank N.R.
St. Johns University
Endowment Fund
N.R.
University of Pittsburgh N.R.
LTCM partners 1,100M 1 ,500M at the beginning of
1998, offset by their $400M
stake in the rescued fund
Source : The International Finance and Commodities Institute <http://www.risk.ific.ch/146520.html>
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Problems
Unsound Practices
Lending institutions' credit risk management and their decision malcing were
faulty in the LTCM case. Those lending institutions'" should have been aware of the
risk of their loan to hedge funds. LTCM partners consisted of famous experts in the
financial markets. Because of its partners' reputation, it became an unusually large
77
1
hedge fund through excessive leverage: many international institutions willingly lent to
LTCM.^^^
On the other hand, institutions usually have derivatives contracts with hedge
funds. If hedge fiinds fail to perform the contracts, institutions face a counterparty
risk.^^^ In the LTCM debacle, that problem arose. LTCM often used unlimited borrowing
power in the OTC derivatives market, borrowing as much as 1,300 times its capital.^^"^
^^*
"Good judgment" is one issue in LTCM. Hearings 3, supra note 10 (statement of William J. Mcdough,
President, FRBNY).
^^^ The examples of banking services to hedge funds are as follows: (1) Direct lending, secured and
unsecured; (2) Lines of credit for foreign exchange, derivatives, fixed income securities, precious metals,
and emerging markets trading; (3) Lines of credit for government securities repurchase agreements; (4)
Standby letters of credit; (5) Payment services for foreign exchange trading; (6) Custodial services; (7)
Securities clearance; (8) Brokerage services for execution and clearing of trades; and (9) cash management
services. Franklin R. Edwards, supra note 21, at 190-91; Hearings 2, supra note 17 (testimony of Julie L.
Williams, Acting Comptroller, OCC).
"°
"Creditors' normal risk management standards were compromised" as a result of "placing too much
reliance on assumed financial strength and reputation . . .." Hearings 3, supra note 10 (testimony of Leon
M. Metzger).
^^' LTCM was very a unique hedge fund because of great leverage and capital. Hearings 3, supra note 10
(testimony of Leon M. Metzger).
^^^ See Hearings 2, supra note 17 (statement of William J. Mcdough, President, FRBNY), (testimony of
Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller, OCC).
^^^ See Hearings 2, supra note 1 7 (statement of Donna Tanoue, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp.) ; Chase Manhattan Corp. disclosed $3.2 billion of its total loan portfolio which is exposed to hedge
funds. Fed ChiefDefends Bailout, CNNFN, Oct. 1, 1998.
274 QYjQ chairperson compared this unlimited borrowing in the OTC derivatives market to the unlimited
borrowing on securities that contributed to the Great Depression. Hearings 2, supra note 17 (testimony of
Brooksley Bom, Chairperson, CFTC).
J' :[ )' '. f 2
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Co-chairman of Citigroup Inc. recalled that the LTCM "never wanted to discuss
what the whole picture was," and Merrill Lynch chairman said that " [w]e really only saw
that part of the portfolio that we did business with."
CFTC's Mistakes
The regulation system was deficient in the LTCM episode. LTCM's structure
was also a limited partnership because of exemption from the regulation of the SEC.
However, it was registered with the CFTC as a CPO, was a member ofNFA,
and reported large investment in U.S. Futures Exchanges. In addition, as a CPO, LTCM
reported its financial statements to the CFTC, namely, LTCM was only subject to
oversight by CFTC.
Even though the regulation of hedge funds was insufficient as the CFTC stated,
the CFTC was able to examine LTCM's financial statements. However, the CFTC
received the news of LTCM's near-bankruptcy from the Department of Treasury,
indicating that CFTC did ignore the financial condition ofLTCM even though the normal
leverage ratio of hedge funds is two to one.
The financial statements of LTCM's largest fund (in which the other
funds invest) showed total assets of about $129 billion, total capital
of about $4.67 billion and net income from operations of about
$1.4billion. Footnotes to the statements showed that the fund held swap
agreements with a notional value of about $697 billion and U.S. and
foreign exchange-traded futures with a notional value of about $47
1
billion. Nothing in the financial statements indicated reason for concern
about the funds' financial condition. LTCM's largest fund had 1997
income from operations of about 30% of its year-end capital, and its
^^^ Michael Siconolfi et al., supra note 223.
"^ There are no reporting requirements concerning OTC derivatives positions. Hearings 3, supra note 10
(testimony of Brooksley Bom, Chairperson, CFTC).
^^^ But see CFTC chairperson said that the annual financial reports filed with CFTC do not fully reveal off-
balance sheet transactions' positions. Thus, CFTC suggested the need for reporting, recordkeeping,
disclosure and price transparency in the OTC derivatives market. Hearings 2, supra note 1 7 (testimony of
Brooksley Bom, Chairperson, CFTC).
"* Hearings 3, supra note 10 (testimony of Leon M. Metzger).
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asset to capital ratio was about 28 to one. During 1995 and 1996, its
annual rate of return on capital had exceeded 40%, and the amount
of its leverage had been approximately the same. The fund was well
capitalized and very profitable. Its asset to capital ratio was similar to
that some other hedge funds as well as many major investment banks
and commercial banks.
After the near-bankruptcy ofLTCM, CFTC recommended that "the need for
increased transparency, the need to eliminate excessive leverage, the need for better
prudential controls, and the need for enhanced international cooperation and
harmonization of regulations" are necessary in hedge funds. In my view, however,
CFTC used unsound practices without examination, and we should note the mistakes of
CFTC and solve the problems in order not to make same mistakes in the future.
Risk Management
Similar to other hedge funds cases, LTCM had enormous losses during August
and September 1998. Thus, the risk management ofLTCM itself and investors'
protection were problematic. Even though Merton and Scholes had pioneered the theory
of options pricing, they did not succeed in risk management.
Transparency and Disclosure
Transparency and disclosure are issues in the LTCM episode. At the first stage,
LTCM had a good reputation due to high returns: 20 percent in 1994, 43 percent in 1995,
41 percent in 1996, and 17 percent in 1997. Because the hedge fund's average
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 105* Cong. (1998)
(testimony of Brooksley Bom, Chairperson, CFTC).<http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speches/bom-41.htm>
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Risk Management and Specialty Crops ofthe House Comm. on
Agriculture, 106* Cong.(1999) (testimony of Brooksley Bom, Chairperson, CFTC).
<http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/bom-49.htm>
^*' Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 1 8, at III, 54 Box 3.4
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performance was 16 percent in 1995 and 17 percent in 1996, LTCM's returns were
excellent.
LTCM was highly leveraged, but many institutional investors invested in LTCM
because of its high returns and partners' fame. Its portfolio, however, was not disclosed
to its investors, and it was famous for "the paucity of information distributed." Thus,
for example, institutional investors and individuals did not receive full information about
the hedge fund. They, therefore, were unable to act until LTCM failed - by then, it was
too late. Because the failure ofLTCM could have had severe consequences for the
international market, the FRBNY intervened in the LTCM bailout plan. In my view,
hedge funds should be regulated in order to make hedge funds transparent in the financial
market.
No Sharing of Information among the Federal Regulators
Even though the CFTC had the financial information about LTCM and knew the
level of debt, the CFTC did not act on the information or share any information with
other federal regulators.^^^ The document LTCM filed with the CFTC in mid-March 1998
indicated that the LTCM had borrowed total $125 billion on $4.7 billion capital ($25 per
282
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Michael Siconolfi et al., supra note 223; Trillion Dollar Bet, supra note 256.
See Hal S. Scott and Philip A. Wellons, supra note 1 14, at 1069.
LTCM: One Bad Apple"? [hereinafter One Bad Apple] <http://www.assetpub.com/archives/ps/9-
1 0psnov/nov98PS 1 4.html>
^*' See Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 18, at III, 54 Box 3.4; Hearings 2, supra note 17 (statement of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, FED); See Hearings 3, supra note 10 (testimony of Lewis A. Sachs, Deputy
Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury); Barry Eichengreen and Donald Mathieson, supra note
48.The Dow Jones Industrial Average was down 283 points by noon. Michael Siconolfi et al., supra note
223.
See Kathleen Day, Top Regulator Was Aware ofFund's Debt; CFTC's Born Failed to Act on Long-
Term Capital Data, WASH. POST, Nov. 1 8, 1998, at CI 1
.
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$1 of its equity capital) and had huge derivatives exposure, $1.3 trillion as of Dec. 31,
J 997 287
The CFTC could easily have shared LTCM's information at a meeting of the
President's Working Group on Financial Markets, where staff members from the CFTC,
SEC, FED, and Treasury meet every two weeks to share "information about the markets,
the major players in those markets, and any potential problems that might be emerging in
the markets." But CFTC did not share LTCM's information with other regulators.
CFTC explained that Section 8 (e) of the CEA prevents CFTC from sharing information
with other federal regulators in any time unless other regulators ask for the
information. Furthermore, the CFTC did not inform the other regulators of LTCM's
financial information, its debt level, until several days after its bailout by a consortium.'^^^
In my judgment, the "perpetual conflict" between SEC and CFTC is the one of reasons
for that situation.
Too-Big-To-Fail Doctrine
In LTCM's case, the too-big-to fail doctrine, which was abandoned after it was
abused by banks and S&Ls in the 1980's, was applied. Because LTCM was so big,
and its impact was so great, it was secured by government intervention. Due to its
reputation and performance, LTCM was able to use excessive leverage, borrow money,
and have many transactions with international major banks and securities firms. With its
'''Id.
'yd.
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities and Government Sponsored Enterprises of
the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106 Cong. (1999) (testimony of Brooksley Bom,
Chairperson, CFTC).<http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/bom-43.htm>
^^° See Kathleen Day, supra note 286.
' See Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa Vinciguerra, supra note 245.
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partners' reputations and its high returns, LTCM had huge transaction with banks and
securities firms in the financial market. The effects outside hedge funds, thus, were very
huge.
LTCM had $ 1.3 trillion OTC derivatives position as of Dec. 31, 1997, had about
72 conterparties on repo and reverse repo transaction and approximately 50
counterparties on OTC derivative transactions. Bear Stems, LTCM's prime broker,
was also a clearing firm for LTCM's U.S. exchange-traded futures and Merrill Lynch
was a clearing firm for non-U. S. exchange-traded futures. If the international financial
community had not rescued it, the effect on the financial market would have been severe:
there are possibilities of domino effect liquidation among counterparties in the financial
market. The LTCM bailout plan came form that background.
However, with the too-big-to-fail doctrine, every hedge fund may want to have a
lot of leverage and borrow more money in order to be safe at any difficult time with that
doctrine. Therefore, this standard goes against the principle of capitalism, and it should
not be applied in the financial market again.
A Double Standard
When Asian countries went through economic crises, the IMF and the U.S.
regulators requested that the indebted companies be closed and that they sell their assets
to creditors.'^^'* However, the U.S. regulators handled the case ofLTCM differently. The
^'^ See Hearing 1, supra note 4 (written testimony of Henry T. C. Hu, Professor of Law, University of
Texas); See Paul Krugman, Rashomon in Connecticut What Really Happened to Long-Term Capital
Management? Slate (Oct. 1, 1998). <http://slate.msn.com/Dismal/98-10-01/Dismal.asp>
^^^ The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
^^* Ellen Frank, Double dealing, NEW INTERNATIONALIST ( May 1999).
<http://oneworld.org/ni/issue3 1 2/dealing.htm>
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LTCM rescue revealed the inequality of a system in which there is only one standard;^^^
"whether in Korea, Thailand, Connecticut [in LTCM], or Brazil, U.S.- and IMF -
organized bailouts conform to the same guiding principle: whatever happens, whoever is
at fault, the wealth of Western creditors must be protected and enhanced."
The Failure of Regulators' Prediction
During the April 13, 1994 hearing, regulators discussed the leverage and impact
of hedge funds. The main concerns of the hearing were "(1) does lending to the funds put
insured depository institutions at risk? and (2) do their speculative trading strategies make
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markets more volatile and less stable than they would be otherwise?" However,
regulators failed to regulate the leverage because they thought the potential problem
would not happen. Five years later, the LTCM near-bankruptcy occurred.
The LTCM debacle case indicated that one hedge fimd "could have potentially
impaired the economies of many nations, including [America.]" Table 5 shows that
there was a failure of regulators' prediction.
^^^ Mark Jickling, supra note 5, at 5.
Hearings 1, supra note 4 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, FED)
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Table 5: The Difference ofRegulators opinions (between 1994 and 1999)
House Hearing(April 1 994) The President's Working Group
on Financial Markets(April 1999)
Does lending
to hedge
funds put
insured
depository
institutions at
risk?
Consensus of banking regulators
present at hearing was that
lending to hedge funds does not
pose significant risk to banks as
such loans were generally well-
collaterized and very small
-Excessive leverage increases
likelihood of break down in
functioning of financial markets
-The near-collapse ofLTCM
illustrates need for all participants
in financial system to face
constraints on amount of leverage
assumed
Do hedge
funds'
speculative
trading
strategies
make
markets more
volatile and
less stable
than they
would be
otherwise?
Witnesses agreed that hedge
funds were not unique in their
trading practices, but were only
one among many groups of
institutional investors active in
markets
-Witnesses also stressed that the
amount of capital managed by
hedge funds is "modest" in
comparison to the total turnover
in global currency and securities
markets
-Concerns expressed about
activities of highly leveraged
institutions with respect to
impact on market dynamics
vulnerable economies
-Activities of hedge funds can
affect markets in some
circumstances and for limited
periods although the activities of
highly leveraged institutions have
not played a significant role in
precipitating financial market
crises of past few years
Participants -FED, SEC, CFTC, OCC -Department of the Treasury,
FED, SEC, CFTC
Source: data from House Hearing (Apr. 1994), The President's Working Group on Financial Markets (Apr.
1999),and Mark Jickling, Hedge Funds, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 5 (June 21,
1994).
Leverage
Leverage is not always bad in the financial market. In particular, it has two
functions: (1) "it creates and enhances the risk of default by market participants"; and (2)
"rapid deleveraging can cause major disruptions in the financial market by exaggerating
market movements."^^^ In particular, LTCM described leverage in its prospectus: "the
299
Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 1 8, at III, 5 1 , Box 3.3.
53
Portfolio Company will typically be very highly leveraged, and such leverage will
fluctuate depending on market conditions." °
Research about leverage of hedge fiinds showed that their leverage degree is
proper.^°' The results of that research were as follows: first, about 30 percent of all hedge
funds did not use leverage; second, about 54 percent of all hedge funds used less than 2 to
1 leverage; third, about 16 percent of all hedge funds used more than 2 to 1 leverage; and
fourth, a few hedge funds used more than 1 to 1 leverage.
If so, LTCM had very high leverage, 25 times its capital, at the end of 1997.
Furthermore, the leverage ratio became higher due to LTCM's losses. LTCM had so
high a leverage system that it could not control "the risk factors present in today's global
markets."^°^
•'^'*
Merrill Lynch &Co., supra note 222, at 8.
^'" Hearinds I, supra note 4 (statement of Steven Lonsdorf, President, Van Hedge Fund Advisers
International).
'''Id.
''' Id
CHAPTERVIII
THE ACTIVITIES OF FINANCIAL COMMUNITY
The President's Working Group on Financial Markets (President's Working Group) ^'^'^
The President's Working Group made a report entitled "Hedge Funds, Leverage
and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management (President's Working Group
Report)" in April 1999."^°^ This report suggested many methods: "[improving]
transparency in the [financial] system, [enhancing] private sector risk management
practices, [developing] more risk-sensitive approaches to adequacy, [supporting]
financial contract netting in the event of bankruptcy, and [encouraging] offshore financial
centers to comply with international standards."
The report stated that " [t]he near collapse ofLTCM illustrates the need for all
participants in our financial system, not only hedge funds, to face constraints on the
amount of leverage they assume" and "in the case ofLTCM, its investors, credits, and
counterparties did not provide an effective check on its overall activities."308
^°'* Members are as follows : Dep. of the Treasury, FED, SEC, CFTC, the Council of Economic Advisers,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Economic Council, the Federal Reserve bank of
New York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision.
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The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
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'''Id
Id
'''Id
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Consequently, the President's Working Group suggested not "direct regulation" but
"indirect regulation."^
'°
The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (CRMPG) >
In January 1999, twelve leading international institutions organized the CRMPG
to improve principles for reinforcing risk management practices for banks, securities
firms and, other institutions which offer credit-based services to HLIs in the financial
markets.^" The CRMPG made a report, "Improving Counterparty Risk Management
Practices," in June 1 999. This paper recommended "enhanced information sharing
between counterparties; an analytical framework for evaluating the effects of leverage on
market liquidity and credit risk; improved credit risk estimation techniques; stronger
internal limit setting; collateral, margin and other credit risk management practices;
improved risk reporting to senior management and regulators; and stronger harmonized
market conventions for key credit documentation."^'^
,n<r
^""^
Direct regulation is "the imposition of a range of regulatory requirements directly on a firm— including
requirements to report to regulators on the firm's activities and financial affairs, and setting minimum
requirements." Report of the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, Hedge Funds and Other Highly Leveraged Institutions, 1 n.5 (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter
IOSCO Report].
^"^ The President's Working Group Report, supra note 16.
Improving Counterparty Risk Management Practices (Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group,
June 1999). <http://www.crmpolicygroup.org>; IOSCO Report, supra note 309, at 2.
''-Id
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The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee)
The Basle Committee made two papers, which were made by a Working Group of
the Basle Committee,^''* in January 1999: (1) Banks' Interactions with Highly Leveraged
Institutions and (2) Sound Practices for Banks' Interactions with Highly Leveraged
Institutions.
Banks' Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions
After reviewing the LTCM episode, the Basle Committee indicated the
insufficiencies in the internal controls and unsound risk management practices of the
TIC
counterparties to LTCM. The paper recommended promoting sound practices,
enhancing transparency of the activities of large HLIs and other global financial
institutions, and regulating HLIs directly.^ '^
Sound Practices for Banks' Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions
This paper recommended sound practices to improve credit risk management
when dealing with HLIs as counterparties. The specific recommendations are as
follows: "(1) establishing clear policies and procedures for banks' involvement with HLIs
as part of their overall credit risk environment; (2) information gathering, due diligence,
and credit analysis of HLIs' activities, risk, and operations; (3) developing more accurate
measures of exposures resulting from trading and derivatives transactions; (4) setting
'''Id.
''* The Working Group on Highly Leveraged Institutions was set up by the Basle Committee in October
1998. It has a mission to analyze the nature of the risks posed by highly leveraged institutions, to assess
banks' risk management practices with respect to HLIs, and to evaluate potential policy responses to
address these risks.
^'^ Banks ' Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions, 2-3 (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision,
Jan. 1999).
^'^ Id at 7.
^'^ A committee of the central banks of the Group of Ten countries.
Sound Practicesfor Banks ' Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institution, 3 (Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision, Jan. 1999).
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meaningful overall credit limits for HLIs; (5) linking credit enhancement tools, including
collateral and early termination provisions, to the specific characteristics of HLIs; and (6)
closely monitoring credit exposure vis-a-vis HLIs, including their trading activities, risk
"5 1 Q
concentration, leverage, and risk management processes."
The Financial Stability Forum (Forum) . '
The Finance Ministers of the Group of Seven (G-7) organized the Financial
Stability Forum.^'^ Its purpose is that "national and international communities can more
effectively co-operate to promote international financial stability, improve the
functioning of the markets, and reduce systemic risk." The Forum established three
vs^orking groups in April 1999.
The Basle Committee and the Technical Committee of International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
Together, these organizations made a paper, "Recommendations for Public
Disclosure of Trading and Derivatives Activities of Banks and Securities Firms." In
this paper, they made two recommendations: "(1) institutions should provide financial
statement users with a clear picture of their trading and derivatives activities, the major
risks associated with these activities, and their performance in managing these risks; and
(2) institutions should disclose information produced by their internal risk measurement
'''Id
^'^ IOSCO Report, supra note 309, at 2.
'''Id
''' Id
'''Id at 3.
''
. .
. .
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and management systems on their risk exposures and actual performance in managing
these exposures."
The Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) > -
The CGFS, former Euro-Currency Standing Committee, established two working
groups to "address the need for additional information in the marketplace:" the "Working
Group on Disclosure" and the "Working Group on Market Information."^^'' The purpose
of the Working Group on Disclosure is to explore "what information should be publicly
disclosed by financial intermediaries to provide a clear view of their exposures to market
and credit risks," and the focus of the Working group on Market Information is to
consider "how the provision of additional aggregate market information could improve
the fiinctioning and stability of markets by contributing to better risk management and
more informed policy decisions. "^'^^
IOSCO
After the near collapse of LTCM, the Technical Committee of the IOSCO
established a special Task Force on Hedge Funds and Other Highly Leveraged
Institutions (Task Force). Its aim was to handle regulatory issues concerning the
activities of HLIs. The Task Force released a paper: "Hedge Funds and Other Highly
Leveraged Institutions."
'''Id
'''Id.
"'Id
'''Idati.
'''Id
'"Id
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This paper made several recommendations: "(1) strengthening risk management
processes at securities firms that act as counterparties to HLIs; (2) guidance to securities
regulators on the scrutiny which should be applied to regulated firms handling HLIs and
the means by which firms should be encouraged to adopt sound practices; (3) improving
information flows about HLI activities to regulated counterparties of HLIs, regulators,
market authorities and to the public more generally; and (4) the advisability of ftirther
work by IOSCO in cooperation with other interested parties, including the Basle
Committee and private sector groups."
''' Id. ZiU-xl
CHAPTER VIX
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF REGULATION
Law Professors' Opinions
There were many hearings in the United States after LTCM's rescue. During
those hearings in the House and Senate, a few law professors presented their opinions on
regulation of hedge funds. Table 6 shows the summary of their opinions.
Table 6: Law Professors ' recommendations
Name Recommendations
David S. Ruder -Oct. 1, 1998 Hearing
- If needed, SEC use emergency power to examine carefully
- Necessary information should be placed in the hands of
responsible regulators who will preserve its confidentiality
Henry T.C. Hu -Oct. 1, 1998 Hearing
- Some issues occurred
(complex-exotic financial products, issues of transparency as to
products and institutions, multiple national jurisdictions, and the
optimal as well as feasible limits of regulatory reach)
John C. Coffee, Jr. - May 6, 1999 Hearing
- Additional hedge fund regulation does not need to protect
investors, counterparties, or creditors, except at the international
G7 level
- Appropriate legislative focus should be on excessive leverage
and the deficiencies in the risk management practices of banks
and securities firms, not investor protection
Source: data from hearings (Oct. 1, 1998, May 6, 1999)
The Hedge Funds Disclosure Act
Richard Baker, a republican Congressman, introduced "The Hedge Fund
Disclosure Act" in order to require "unregulated hedge funds" to submit regular reports
to the FED."'^° This proposed legislation requires large ftmds to make themselves and
330 A republican Richard Baker introduced. H.R.2924, 106* Cong. (1999).
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their financial dealings transparent to the public and to securities and banking regulators.
Moreover, under the proposed bill, a hedge fund with more than $3 billion of capital or
with assets in excess of $20 billion must file quarterly reports with the FED, the Treasury
Department, and the SEC. This bill is criticized, however, because it applies only to a
very small number of hedge funds, i.e., fewer than ten will be regulated under the bill
'ITT
from among about 5,830 hedge funds.
In my view, this regulation of hedge funds is a welcomed first step. However, in
order to regulate hedge funds, we must first consider the definition of hedge funds. If
hedge funds are described as a type of mutual fund, even though there are some
differences, then mutual fund regulations can be applied to hedge funds. In addition, this
bill requests that hedge fund information should be revealed to the public, but, in my
opinion, this information should be limited to regulators.
Benefits and Costs in Regulation of Hedge Funds
Table 7 shows the benefits and costs of regulation and deregulation. In
regulation, there are two approaches. First, direct regulation imposes regulatory
requirements directly on hedge funds by, for example, reporting their activities and
financial statements and setting minimum requirements.^^"* Second, indirect regulation
controls hedge funds indirectly through counterparties such as banks, securities firms,
and other institutions which have relationships with hedge fionds through trading
"' Section 4. (Public reports required). Id.
"' M. Corey Goldman, supra note 1.
^^^
"There are a number of critical obstacles to the direct regulation HLIs. It cited difficulties in giving a
precise legal definition of "highly leveraged institution." in the "Report on Highly Leveraged Institutions"
(HILs). Basle Committee Urges Hedge Funds Risk Assessment, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 1999.
""• IOSCO Report, supra note 309.
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transactions or the lending of money. Regulators can get a great deal of information from
hedge funds through direct regulation, but this has some disadvantages for hedge funds
can have disadvantage because their rivals can get their confidential information. In
addition, hedge funds do not like direct regulation because they are accustomed to >
deregulation and flexible management. On the other hand, indirect regulation has less
regulation effect because hedge funds' counterparties control them. With sound
practices, banks and securities firms indirectly regulate hedge funds. However, there is
the possibility of returning to unsound practices as in the LTCM case. If regulators and
counterparties do not regulate hedge funds, potential risks or market turbulence will
continue to exist in the financial market.
Table 7: Comparison between regulation and deregulation
Benefits Costs
Direct Regulation -Protect potential risk or
turbulence in the financial
market
-Investor protection
-An exodus of U.S. hedge
funds to offshore
- Disclosure management
confidentiality to rivals
-Inflexibility in
management
-Interference in financial
innovation
Indirect Regulation -Protect potential risk or
turbulence in the financial
market
-Investor protection
-Less regulation effect
-The possibility of return to
unsound practices
Deregulation -Flexibility in management
-Protect management
privacy
-Prevent an exodus of U.S.
hedge funds to offshore
-Existence of potential risk
-No investors protection
Source: data from summary.
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Discussion
Financial Innovation exceeds Regulation
Some experts argue that "it is illogical to focus upon a category of instruments
and base regulation upon it in a world of financial innovation in which new instruments
outside the definitional boundaries of the law continually arise." From this viewpoint,
they recommended that "the optimal approach is a global voluntary initiative of 'best
practices' [— market risk management, credit procedures, and information availability,
sales and documentation practices, and internal and external audits—] that covers not only
major commercial and investment banks, but also significant end users, including hedge
funds such as LTCM."^^^
If an instrument threatens the world financial market, however, we should think
differently. In the above-mentioned MIF case, external auditors, one of the "best
practices," did not work. On the other hand, Julian Robertson, the operator of one of the
world's foremost hedge fund, stated that "some additional regulation in [the
transparency] area would be beneficial."^^^Additionally, in my judgment, hedge funds are
one of derivatives of mutual funds. The regulation of hedge funds, therefore, would not
be difficult.
^^^ Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa Vinciguerra, supra note 245.
'''Id.
64
Significant Public Interest
After LTCM's near-bankruptcy and bailout, arguments have continued about the
TT O
necessity of new regulatory measures and the character of regulation in hedge funds.
The idea of investor protection in hedge funds is that wealthy and sophisticated
investors can protect their risk on their ovm. If all investors were
wealthy people, there would be no argument because the bankruptcy of the hedge
fund would just be the problem of individuals.
In fact, most investors in hedge ftinds during the 1960's and 1970's were "private
individuals.""''^°After that, however, "high net worth" individuals, "fiind of funds," and
"feeder funds" became investors in hedge funds.^"*^ In addition, private banks, university
endowment funds, pension plans, and insurance companies appeared as investors in
hedge funds.^"*^ Nowadays, most institutions, for example, investment banks, insurance
companies, and commercial banks, invest in hedge funds. In 1996, pension funds and
other qualified plans comprised 14 percent, and endowments and foundations comprised
- 343
6 percent.
If there is a big loss in the hedge funds in which they invest, the investors of those
institutions will receive the same loss. Also, fiduciary institutions, for example, pension
funds and charity foundations, invest in hedge funds; thus, the failure of hedge funds will
'^^ Remarks of Brooksley Bom, Chairperson Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Fordham
University School Law 1999 Derivatives & Risk Management Symposium (Jan. 28, 1999).
<http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/bom-42.htm>
^^* See Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa Vinciguerra, supra note 245.
"' See Franklin R. Edwards, supra note 2 1 , at 1 90-9 1 ; The task Force on Hedge Funds, supra note 122.
''*" See Matthias Bekier, supra note 20, at 98.
^'^ See Id.
342
See generally Id. at 98-99.
^^^ One BadApplel supra note 284.
65
have effects on the beneficiaries of the fiduciary institutions. If so, the bankruptcy of
hedge funds can be a social problem and can be of "significant public interest." Foe
example, in the LTCM debacle, both the St. Johns University endowment fund and the
University of Pittsburgh were investors and both suffered.^"^^ In those cases, we should
handle the situation differently.
When we consider UBS' situation with regard to LTCM, it appears to be urgent to
protect the investors in hedge funds. In reality, sophisticated investors do not evaluate
the merits and risks of their investments in hedge funds as we can see in the LTCM
episode. Usually, hedge funds borrow money from banks to leverage their
investments."'''^ Thus, if hedge funds have large losses, they will default on their loans,
and banks will be negatively impacted. Banks should become aware of and consider the
inherent risks of investing in hedge funds.
Banks should also check their loans for hedge funds. However, in reality, banks
often do not pay attention to those risks, but merely rely on the reputation of managers of
hedge funds, as in LTCM. If the counterparty risks to hedge funds are calculated with
more precision, banks will be able to predict risks and avoid a financial fiasco.
Exodus of U.S. Hedge Funds
Most regulators worry about an "exodus" of U.S. hedge funds to offshore as a
result of the regulation of hedge funds in the United States."'''^ In addition, regulators
argue that the "exodus" of U.S. hedge funds indicates that "the business would be
^'^ See Franklin R. Edwards, supra note 21, at 190-91.
^'*^ David Shirreff, supra note 239.
^^ See Hearings 1, supra note 4 (statement of John P. LaWare, Member, FED).
See Hearings I, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. Bernard Sanders).
'''*
After LTCM episode, regulators focused on this counterparty risk: thus, there are more regulations than
before.
66
transplanted in jurisdictions with weaker or nonexistent regulatory regimes and less
developed legal and judicial systems, with the result of increasing systemic risk
worldwide."^^^
It is questionable whether hedge funds can be effectively directly
regulated in the United States alone. While their financial clout may
be large, hedge funds' physical presence is small. Given the amazing
communication capabilities available virtually around the globe, trades
can be initiated from almost any location. Indeed, most hedge funds
are only a short step from cyberspace. Any direct U.S. regulations
restricting their flexibility will doubtless induce the more aggressive
funds to emigrate from under our jurisdiction. The best we can do in
my judgment is what we do today: Regulate them indirectly through
the regulation of the sources of their funds. We are thus able to
monitor far better hedge funds' activity, especially as they influence
U.S financial markets. If the funds move abroad, our oversight will
diminish.
^^'
However, about 70 percent of hedge fund assets under management in 1 997
already had "offshore jurisdiction." If there are some relationships with the U.S. (i.e.,
when hedge fiinds trade on U.S. Futures and Option Exchange or have U.S. investors),
hedge funds must be registered with CFTC and NFA under the CEA provision. Thus,
there will be no difference from the current system. Therefore, the "exodus" of U.S.
hedge funds will not be a big problem.
^^ See Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa Vinciguerra, supra note 245; Barry Eichengreen et al., supra note 27,
at 23.
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^^° Thomas A. Russo and Marlisa Vinciguerra, Id.
Hearings I, supra note 4 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, FED).
"^ Barry Eichengreen et al., supra note 27, at 32 Table 3.3 (source: Mar/Hedge).
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Moral Hazard
It is worth mentioning that Meriwether "^ and his former five partners have
established a new hedge fund whose investment strategies are similar to LTCM's^^'* since
negotiating with Wall Street executives about the possibility of creating a new fund.^^^
LTCM was a limited partnership, but it was bailed out by the intervention of the Federal
Reserve. Even though LTCM caused major problems in the financial market, it received
no penalty whereas Askin in ACM received sanctions from the SEC.
^^^ A news story indicated the morality of Meriwether. "Meriwether signed an 'interspousal transfer grant
deed' transfering a 20-acre vacant lot in a tony residential area of Pebble Beach, Calif, to his wife... A
Business Week examination of public records shows that long before the Aug.27 transfer, Meriwether had
shielded his own and his partners assets in the event LTCM ever got into trouble." Meriwether Transferred
Property to Wife During LTCM's Fall, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct.8, 1998.
<http://www.businesswire.com/webbox/bw.1008998/831675.htm>
^^* Sholes is doing business in "a new on-line trading venture," and Merton is at Harvard University and JP
Morgan consultant. Trillion Dollar Bet, supra note 256.
^ LTCM to Repay Debts Original Investors in Long-Term Capital to Get Money Back, CNNfn, Jan. 1 8,
1999.
CHAPTER VX
CONCLUSION
Merton confessed that "[LTCM's near-bankruptcy was] like getting hit by a
truck," and Sholes stated that "I personally don't think that [the Black-Scholes models
are] the reason. It could be inputs to the models, it could be the models themselves, it
could be a combination of many things. And so just saying models were flawed is not
necessarily the right answer."^^^ Peter Fisher, executive vice president of the FRBNY,
said that "I can suppose what [the reason for LTCM's debacle] would be, but I don't yet
know [whether the LTCM episode] was a random event or whether [the LTCM episode
was caused by] negligence on [LTCM] and [LTCM's] creditors' parts."
The LTCM case indicates that hedge funds could produce "a significant public
interest" in the United States and the world. The conflict between "flexible management"
and "public interest" should be solved. If something causes "a public policy issue,"
regulators should take an action. Furthermore, in my judgment, hedge funds are
"essentially unregulated mutual funds," thus, the concept of regulation should come from
the regulation system of mutual funds. The LTCM case also presented the cost of
deregulation and the cost of regulation of hedge funds. Even though it was just one case,
it indicated the huge potential cost of deregulation.
^ Trillion Dollar Bet, supra note 256.
'''Id.
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One possible reason for the excellent returns of hedge funds could be their
5 CO
freedom from regulation, thus we should not destroy this advantage. However, we
should consider the regulation of hedge funds step by step. In addition, the starting point
of regulation is not commodity but mutual funds.
In my view, we should have two approaches to regulation of hedge funds. First,
with respect to investor protection, if there is the possibility of the cause of a significant
public interest, regulators should use direct and indirect regulation. For example, if
investors are pension plans or university endowment funds, the concept of mutual fiinds
should be adopted. Second, with respect to market turbulence protection, indirect
regulation is more useful. However, if there is an urgent situation, emergency power
should be used by regulators. In addition, the cooperation of regulators should be
enhanced by legislation.
Nobody can confirm whether the regulation of hedge funds is a good idea at this
time. However, the remarks of the FED chairman provide some indications about the
future regulation of hedge funds: "We do not yet fully understand the new [global
financial] system's dynamics. We are learning fast, and need to update and modify our
institutions and practices to reduce the risks inherent in the new regime."
^^^ See Mark Jickling, supra note 5, at 5.
^^^ Outlook Dec. 1998, supra note 1 8, at III, 65, n. 27. L^W LsDHil^Y
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